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Banks' Liquidity Management and Systemic Risk

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  • E. Panetti
  • LG Deidda

    ()

Abstract

We study a novel mechanism to explain the interaction between banks' liquidity management and the emergence of systemic financial crises, in the form of self-fulfilling runs. To this end, we develop an environment where banks offer insurance to their depositors against both idiosyncratic and aggregate real shocks, by holding a portfolio of liquidity and illiquid productive assets. Moreover, banks' asset portfolios and the probability of a depositors' self-fulfilling run are jointly determined via a "global game". We characterize the sufficient conditions under which there exists a unique threshold recovery rate, associated with the early liquidation of the productive assets, below which the banks first employ liquidity and then liquidate, in order to finance depositors' early withdrawals. Ex ante, the banks hold more liquidity than in a full-information economy, where there are no self-fulfilling runs and risk is only due to idiosyncratic and aggregate real shocks.

Suggested Citation

  • E. Panetti & LG Deidda, 2017. "Banks' Liquidity Management and Systemic Risk," Working Paper CRENoS 201705, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  • Handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201705
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    2. Viral V. Acharya & Ouarda Merrouche, 2013. "Precautionary Hoarding of Liquidity and Interbank Markets: Evidence from the Subprime Crisis," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 107-160.
    3. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2006. "Bank runs and investment decisions revisited," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 217-232, March.
    4. Adam Ashcraft & James Mcandrews & David Skeie, 2011. "Precautionary Reserves and the Interbank Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43, pages 311-348, October.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    6. Foley-Fisher, Nathan & Narajabad, Borghan N. & Verani, Stephane, 2015. "Self-fulfilling Runs: Evidence from the U.S. Life Insurance Industry," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-32, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
    7. Emmanuel Farhi & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2009. "A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 973-992.
    8. Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, 2005. "Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1293-1327, June.
    9. Ahnert, Toni & Elamin, Mahmoud, 2014. "The Effect of Safe Assets on Financial Fragility in a Bank-Run Model," Working Papers (Old Series) 1437, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    10. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2012. "Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader's Guide," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(1), pages 128-150, March.
    11. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998. "Optimal Financial Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1245-1284, August.
    12. Cooper, Russell & Ross, Thomas W., 1998. "Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 27-38, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    systemic risk; global games; excess liquidity; bank runs;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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