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The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?

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  • Lisa Bruttel

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  • Lisa Bruttel, 2009. "The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 113-136, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:96:y:2009:i:2:p:113-136
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-008-0048-5
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    1. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    2. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    3. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages 80-95, March.
    4. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 571-599, May.
    5. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
    6. Hans-Theo Normann & Brian Wallace, 2012. "The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 707-718, August.
    7. Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2004. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 857-869, September.
    8. Deneckere, R., 1983. "Duopoly supergames with product differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 37-42.
    9. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414, Elsevier.
    10. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
    11. Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    12. Symeonidis, George, 2002. "Cartel stability with multiproduct firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 339-352, March.
    13. Feinberg, Robert M & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "An Experimental Test of Discount-Rate Effects on Collusive Behaviour in Duopoly Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 153-160, June.
    14. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalo Ballestero, 2022. "Collusion and Artificial Intelligence: A Computational Experiment with Sequential Pricing Algorithms under Stochastic Costs," Working Papers 118, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    2. Cheng, Long & McDonald, Stuart & Ye, Guangliang, 2023. "Cartelization under present bias and imperfect public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 77-86.
    3. Bruttel, Lisa & Fischbacher, Urs, 2013. "Taking the initiative. What characterizes leaders?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 147-168.
    4. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    5. Gonzalo Ballestero, 2021. "Collusion and Artificial Intelligence: A computational experiment with sequential pricing algorithms under stochastic costs," Young Researchers Working Papers 1, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Oct 2022.
    6. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2016. "Price Fixing Hits Home: An Empirical Study of US Price-Fixing Conspiracies," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(4), pages 361-379, June.
    7. Messinger, Paul R., 2016. "The role of fairness in competitive supply chain relationships: An experimental studyAuthor-Name: Choi, Sungchul," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(3), pages 798-813.
    8. Williams Huamani & Marcelo José Braga & Lucas Campio Pinha, 2024. "Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 275-287, April.
    9. Justin Fox & Mattias Polborn, 2021. "On the separation of executive and legislative powers: Executive independence, liberty, and social welfare," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 430-454, October.
    10. Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2013. "Oligopoly Experiments In The Current Millennium," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 439-460, July.
    11. Orland, Andreas, 2025. "Sharing rules in Bertrand duopolies with increasing returns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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