Are conditional cooperators willing to forgo efficiency gains? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo, 2013.
"Self-selection into Economics Experiments is Driven by Monetary Rewards,"
2013-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Abeler, Johannes & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2013. "Self-Selection into Economics Experiments Is Driven by Monetary Rewards," IZA Discussion Papers 7374, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Johannes Abeler & Daniele Nosenzo, 2015. "Self-selection into laboratory experiments: pro-social motives versus monetary incentives," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(2), pages 195-214, June.
More about this item
Keywordspublic goods experiments; conditional cooperation; fairness; efficiency; social values;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:45:y:2011:i:1-2:p:47-57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RNZP20 .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .