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Are R&D Subsidies Provided Optimally? Evidence from a Simulated Agency-Firm Stochastic Dynamic Game

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Abstract

By means of a simulated funding-agency/supported-firm stochastic dynamic game, this paper shows that the level of the subsidy provided by a funding (public) agency, normally used to correct for firm R&D shortage, might be severely underprovided. This is due to the "externalities" generated by the agency-firm strategic relationship, as showed by comparing two versions of the model: one assuming "rival" behaviors between companies and agency (i.e., the current setting), and one associated to the "cooperative" strategy (i.e. the optimal Pareto-efficient benchmark). The paper looks also at what "welfare" implications are associated to different degrees of persistency in the funding effect on corporate R&D. Three main conclusions are thus drawn: (i) the relative quota of the subsidy to R&D is undersized in the rival compared to the cooperative model; (ii) the rivalry strategy generates distortions that favor the agency compared to firms; (iii) when passing from less persistent to more persistent R&D additionality/crowding-out effect, the lower the distortion the greater the variance is and vice versa. As for the management of R&D funding policies, we suggest that all the elements favouring greater collaboration between agency and firm objectives may help current R&D support to approach its social optimum.

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  • Giovanni Cerulli, 2012. "Are R&D Subsidies Provided Optimally? Evidence from a Simulated Agency-Firm Stochastic Dynamic Game," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 15(1), pages 1-7.
  • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2011-1-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Cerulli & Federico Cecconi & Maria Augusta Miceli & Pierpaolo Angelini & Bianca Potì, 2015. "R&Dsimulab: a micro-policy simulator for an ex-ante assessment of the effect of public R&D policies," EcoMod2015 8631, EcoMod.
    2. Dai, Xiaoyong & Cheng, Liwei, 2015. "The effect of public subsidies on corporate R&D investment: An application of the generalized propensity score," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 90(PB), pages 410-419.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    R&D Subsidies; Rivalry Versus Cooperation; Dynamic-Stochastic Games; Simulations;

    JEL classification:

    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques

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