Do Microloan Officers Want to Lend to the Less Advantaged? Evidence from a Choice Experiment
The mission of microfinance is generally perceived as compensation for the failure of the mainstream financial institutions to deliver access to finance to the poor. Microloan officers are central players in microloan origination process. We conduct a choice experiment in Burundi, one of the poorest countries in the world, to determine whether the poorer and more deprived are indeed given preference by microloan officers. The results suggest that the less advantaged individuals have just slightly higher chances of being granted a loan. Surprisingly, we find very little difference between the preferences of microloan officers of nonprofit and for-profit MFIs.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Patrick Francois & Michael Vlassopoulos, 2008. "Pro-social Motivation and the Delivery of Social Services," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 54(1), pages 22-54, March.
- repec:feb:artefa:0087 is not listed on IDEAS
- Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2004.
"Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2003. "Competition and incentives with motivated agents," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2202, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Tim Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and incentives with motivated agents," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 928, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Emilios C. Galariotis & Christophe Villa & Nurmukhammad Yusupov, 2011.
"Recent advances in lending to the poor with asymmetric information,"
- Emilios Galariotis & Christophe Villa & Nurmukhammad Yusupov, 2011. "Recent Advances in Lending to the Poor with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(9), pages 1371-1390, July.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh & Guinnane, Timothy W., 1999.
"The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 195-228, October.
- Maitreesh Ghatak & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Working Papers 791, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Ghatak, M. & Guinnane, T.W., 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Papers 791, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Maitreesh Ghatak & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Discussion Papers 98-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- D'Espallier, Bert & Guérin, Isabelle & Mersland, Roy, 2011. "Women and Repayment in Microfinance: A Global Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 758-772, May.
- Marc Labie & Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Roy Mersland & Ariane Szafarz, 2015.
"Discrimination by Microcredit Officers: Theory and Evidence on Disability in Uganda,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/226217, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Labie, Marc & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Mersland, Roy & Szafarz, Ariane, 2015. "Discrimination by microcredit officers: Theory and evidence on disability in Uganda," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 44-55.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Roy Mersland & Ariane Szafarz & Marc Labie, 2011. "Discrimination by Microcredit Officers:Theory and Evidence on Disability in Uganda," DULBEA Working Papers 11-06, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Marc Labie & Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Roy Mersland & Ariane Szafarz, 2010. "Discrimination by Microcredit Officers: Theory and Evidence on Disability in Uganda," Working Papers CEB 10-007.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Cull, Robert & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Morduch, Jonathan, 2006.
"Financial performance and outreach : a global analysis of leading microbanks,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3827, The World Bank.
- Robert Cull & Asli Demirguç-Kunt & Jonathan Morduch, 2007. "Financial performance and outreach: a global analysis of leading microbanks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(517), pages F107-F133, 02.
- John List & Michael Taylor & Paramita Sinha, 2006.
"Using choice experiments to value non-market goods and services: Evidence from field experiments,"
Natural Field Experiments
00278, The Field Experiments Website.
- List John A. & Sinha Paramita & Taylor Michael H., 2006. "Using Choice Experiments to Value Non-Market Goods and Services: Evidence from Field Experiments," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-39, January.
- Levitt, Steven D. & List, John A., 2009.
"Field experiments in economics: The past, the present, and the future,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-18, January.
- John List & Steven Levitt, 2008. "Field experiments in economics: The past, the present, and the future," Artefactual Field Experiments 00079, The Field Experiments Website.
- Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, 2008. "Field Experiments in Economics: The Past, The Present, and The Future," NBER Working Papers 14356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ibanez, Marcela & Carlsson, Fredrik, 2010.
"A survey-based choice experiment on coca cultivation,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 249-263, November.
- Marcela Ibanez & Fredrik Carlsson, 2009. "A survey-based choice experiment on coca cultivation," Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth - Discussion Papers 17, Courant Research Centre PEG.
- Aubert, Cécile & de Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 2009.
"Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 153-162, September.
- Cécile Aubert & Elisabeth Sadoulet & Alain De Janvry, 2009. "Designing Credit Agent Incentives to Prevent Mission Drift in Pro-Poor Microfinance Institutions," Post-Print hal-00382221, HAL.
- Carlsson, Fredrik & Martinsson, Peter, 2001. "Do Hypothetical and Actual Marginal Willingness to Pay Differ in Choice Experiments?: Application to the Valuation of the Environment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 179-192, March.
- Mersland, Roy & Strøm, R. Øystein, 2010. "Microfinance Mission Drift?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 28-36, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:42:y:2013:i:c:p:182-198. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.