IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

How to Reconcile Financial Incentives and Prosocial Motivation of Loan Officers in Microfinance?

Listed author(s):
  • Julie De Pril
  • Cécile Godfroid
Registered author(s):

    It has been widely recognized that the microfinance sector should pursue both social and financial objectives (double bottom line objective). However, with the growing success of microfinance, numerous microfinance institutions (MFIs) experience mission drift when they focus only on their financial mission at the expense of their social one. The mainstream incentive schemes set up by MFIs for their loan officers are one of the factors contributing to mission drift for several reasons. First, monetary rewards based on financial criteria may lead unscrupulous loan officers to push clients into overindebtedness. Second, financial incentives may have a negative effect on the prosocial motivation animating numerous microfinance loan officers. In this paper, we attempt to suggest, with a mathematical model, an optimal incentive scheme double bottom line on which MFIs could rely in order to preserve loan officers’ prosocial motivation while paying attention to their financial profit.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/248473/3/wp17011.pdf
    File Function: Œuvre complète ou partie de l'œuvre
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series Working Papers CEB with number 17-011.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 21 p.
    Date of creation: 17 Mar 2017
    Publication status: Published by:
    Handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/248473
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    CP114/03, 42 avenue F.D. Roosevelt, 1050 Bruxelles

    Phone: +32 (0)2 650.48.64
    Fax: +32 (0)2 650.41.88
    Web page: http://difusion.ulb.ac.be
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as
    in new window


    1. Aubert, Cécile & de Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 2009. "Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 153-162, September.
    2. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
    3. Amin, Sajeda & Rai, Ashok S. & Topa, Giorgio, 2003. "Does microcredit reach the poor and vulnerable? Evidence from northern Bangladesh," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 59-82, February.
    4. Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-755, September.
    5. Dan Ariely & Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, 2009. "Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 544-555, March.
    6. Labie, Marc & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Mersland, Roy & Szafarz, Ariane, 2015. "Discrimination by microcredit officers: Theory and evidence on disability in Uganda," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 44-55.
    7. Serrano-Cinca, Carlos & Gutiérrez-Nieto, Begoña, 2014. "Microfinance, the long tail and mission drift," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 181-194.
    8. Uschi Backes-Gellner & Donata Bessey & Kerstin Pull & Simone Tuor, 2008. "What Behavioural Economics Teaches Personnel Economics," Working Papers 0077, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
    9. Sagamba, MoÏse & Shchetinin, Oleg & Yusupov, Nurmukhammad, 2013. "Do Microloan Officers Want to Lend to the Less Advantaged? Evidence from a Choice Experiment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 182-198.
    10. S. Dellavigna., 2011. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 5.
    11. Kevin Murdock, 2002. "Intrinsic Motivation and Optimal Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 650-671, Winter.
    12. Morduch, Jonathan, 2000. "The Microfinance Schism," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 617-629, April.
    13. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    14. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810.
    15. Alexander Pepper & Julie Gore, 2014. "The economic psychology of incentives: an international study of top managers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51655, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, 2003. "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism," Microeconomics 0305007, EconWPA.
    17. S. Bowles & S. Polania-Reyes., 2013. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 4.
    18. Frey, Bruno S & Jegen, Reto, 2001. " Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
    19. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    20. Rahman, Aminur, 1999. "Micro-credit initiatives for equitable and sustainable development: Who pays?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 67-82, January.
    21. Pepper, Alexander & Gore, Julie, 2014. "The economic psychology of incentives: An international study of top managers," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 350-361.
    22. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    23. Shchetinin, Oleg & Wollbrant, Conny, 2013. "The intermediary role of microloan officers: Evidence from Ethiopia," Working Papers in Economics 581, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    24. Dan Lovallo & Colin Camerer, 1999. "Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 306-318, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/248473. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Benoit Pauwels)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.