The economic psychology of incentives: An international study of top managers
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pepper, Alexander, 2017. "Applying economic psychology to the problem of executive compensation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 79675, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Julie De Pril & Cécile Godfroid, 2017. "How to Reconcile Financial Incentives and Prosocial Motivation of Loan Officers in Microfinance?," Working Papers CEB 17-011, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
More about this item
KeywordsAgency theory; Behavioral economics; Executive compensation; Motivation; Long-term incentives;
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