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The form of government and fiscal dynamics

  • Andersen, Jørgen Juel

Using a combination of time series variation in oil prices and cross-section variation in the oil intensity of countries, this paper investigates whether exogenous shifts in the government revenues affect the government expenditures differently depending on the political institutions of the form of government. Comparing the fiscal policy dynamics in parliamentary and presidential systems, a main finding is that the government expenditures appear more responsive to shifts in the revenues when the form of government is presidential.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 27 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 297-310

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:2:p:297-310
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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