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Assessing the effects of disability insurance experience rating. The case of The Netherlands

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  • de Groot, Nynke
  • Koning, Pierre

Abstract

Experience-rated disability insurance (DI) premiums are often advocated as a means to stimulate firms to reduce DI inflow and increase DI outflow. To assess the size of these intended effects of experience rating, this study provides an empirical analysis of the effects of DI experience rating in The Netherlands. We use a difference-in-difference approach with administrative matched firm- and worker data that exploits the removal of experience rating for small firms in 2003 and 2004. According to our results, removing experience rating caused an increase of DI inflow of about 7% for small firms, while DI outflow decreased by 12% as a result of the reform. We argue that these effects were largely confined to the first year of DI benefit receipt.

Suggested Citation

  • de Groot, Nynke & Koning, Pierre, 2016. "Assessing the effects of disability insurance experience rating. The case of The Netherlands," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 304-317.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:41:y:2016:i:c:p:304-317
    DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.007
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Koning, Pierre & Muller, Paul & Prudon, Roger, 2022. "Why Do Temporary Workers Have Higher Disability Insurance Risks Than Permanent Workers?," IZA Discussion Papers 15173, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Koning, Pierre & van Lent, Max, 2022. "Workers' Moral Hazard and Insurer Effort in Disability Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers 15164, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Nynke de Groot & Pierre Koning, 2022. "A burden too big to bear? The effect of experience‐rated disability insurance premiums on firm bankruptcies and employment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 124(1), pages 214-242, January.
    4. Koning Pierre & Vethaak Heike, 2021. "Decomposing Employment Trends of Disabled Workers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(4), pages 1217-1255, October.
    5. Kyyrä, Tomi & Tuomala, Juha, 2023. "The effects of employers’ disability and unemployment insurance costs on benefit inflows," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    6. Kyyrä, Tomi & Paukkeri, Tuuli, 2018. "Does experience rating reduce sickness and disability claims? Evidence from policy kinks," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 178-192.
    7. De Brouwer, Octave & Tojerow, Ilan, 2023. "The Growth of Disability Insurance in Belgium: Determinants and Policy Implications," IZA Discussion Papers 16376, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Kyyrä, Tomi & Paukkeri, Tuuli, 2018. "Using a Kinked Policy Rule to Estimate the Effect of Experience Rating on Disability Inflow," Working Papers 105, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    9. Tunga Kantarcı & Jan‐Maarten van Sonsbeek & Yi Zhang, 2023. "The heterogeneous impact of stricter criteria for disability insurance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(9), pages 1898-1920, September.
    10. Hassink Wolter H.J. & Koning Pierre & Zwinkels Wim, 2018. "Do Firms with Low Disability Risks Opt Out from Public to Private Insurance?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-11, January.
    11. Werner Eichhorst, 2017. "Labor Market Institutions and the Future of Work: Good Jobs for All?," Working Papers id:11689, eSocialSciences.
    12. Pierre Koning, 2016. "Privatizing sick pay: Does it work?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 324-324, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disability insurance; Experience rating; Differences-in-differences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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