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Efficiency Effects of Premium-Setting Regimes under Workers' Compensation: Canada and the United States

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  • Bruce, Christopher J
  • Atkins, Frank J

Abstract

The authors develop a model in which it is predicted that more resources will be devoted to safety in a workers' compensation system with experience-rated.premiums than in one with flat-rated premiums. They test this model by observing the effect on fatality rates of the move from flat rating to experience rating in the forestry and construction industries of Ontario, Canada. The evidence provides strong confirmation of the theory. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce, Christopher J & Atkins, Frank J, 1993. "Efficiency Effects of Premium-Setting Regimes under Workers' Compensation: Canada and the United States," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(1), pages 38-69, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:11:y:1993:i:1:p:s38-69
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    Cited by:

    1. Kyyrä, Tomi & Paukkeri, Tuuli, 2018. "Does experience rating reduce sickness and disability claims? Evidence from policy kinks," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 178-192.
    2. Kyyrä, Tomi & Tuomala, Juha, 2023. "The effects of employers’ disability and unemployment insurance costs on benefit inflows," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    3. Pierre Koning, 2004. "Estimating the impact of experience rating on the inflow into disability insurance in the Netherlands," CPB Discussion Paper 37.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    4. Vikström, Johan, 2009. "The effect of employer incentives in social insurance on individual wages," Working Paper Series 2009:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    5. de Groot, Nynke & Koning, Pierre, 2016. "Assessing the effects of disability insurance experience rating. The case of The Netherlands," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 304-317.
    6. Askenazy, Philippe, 2006. "Some determinants of reporting workplace accidents in France: The role of labour contract," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0603, CEPREMAP.
    7. Terry Thomason & Silvana Pozzebon, 2002. "Determinants of Firm Workplace Health and Safety and Claims Management Practices," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 55(2), pages 286-307, January.
    8. Danzon, Patricia M & Harrington, Scott E, 2001. "Worker's Compensation Rate Regulation: How Price Controls Increase Costs," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 1-36, April.
    9. Kyyrä, Tomi & Paukkeri, Tuuli, 2018. "Using a Kinked Policy Rule to Estimate the Effect of Experience Rating on Disability Inflow," IZA Discussion Papers 11409, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Guylaine Baril & Paul Lanoie, 1996. "Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral Hazard in Workers' Compensation : The Canadian Context," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-05, CIRANO.
    11. Pierre Koning, 2004. "Estimating the impact of experience rating on the inflow into disability insurance in the Netherlands," CPB Discussion Paper 37, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    12. Tomas Philipson & George Zanjani, 1997. "Consumption vs. Production of Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Psacale Lengagne & Anissa Afrite, 2015. "Experience Rating, Incidence of Musculoskeletal Disorders and Related Absences.Results from a Natural Experiment," Working Papers DT69, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Jul 2015.
    14. Matthew S. Johnson & Daniel Schwab & Patrick Koval, 2022. "Legal Protection Against Retaliatory Firing Improves Workplace Safety," Working Papers 2203, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    15. Pascale Lengagne, 2015. "Workers Compensation Insurance: Incentive Effects of Experience Rating on Work-related Health and Safety," Working Papers DT64, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Jan 2015.
    16. Kyyrä, Tomi & Tuomala, Juha, 2013. "Does Experience Rating Reduce Disability Inflow?," IZA Discussion Papers 7344, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Pascale Lengagne, 2016. "Experience Rating and Work-Related Health and Safety," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 69-97, March.

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