Efficiency Effects of Premium-Setting Regimes under Workers' Compensation: Canada and the United States
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Cited by:
- Tomas Philipson & George Zanjani, 1997. "Consumption vs. Production of Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pascale Lengagne & Anissa Afrite, 2015. "Experience Rating, Incidence of Musculoskeletal Disorders and Related Absences.Results from a Natural Experiment," Working Papers DT69, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Jul 2015.
- Vikström, Johan, 2009. "The effect of employer incentives in social insurance on individual wages," Working Paper Series 2009:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- de Groot, Nynke & Koning, Pierre, 2016.
"Assessing the effects of disability insurance experience rating. The case of The Netherlands,"
Labour Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 304-317.
- De Groot, Nynke & Koning, Pierre, 2016. "Assessing the Effects of Disability Insurance Experience Rating: The Case of the Netherlands," IZA Discussion Papers 9742, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Pascale Lengagne, 2016. "Experience Rating and Work-Related Health and Safety," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 69-97, March.
- Pascale Lengagne, 2015. "Workers Compensation Insurance: Incentive Effects of Experience Rating on Work-related Health and Safety," Working Papers DT64, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Jan 2015.
- Kyyrä, Tomi & Tuomala, Juha, 2013.
"Does Experience Rating Reduce Disability Inflow?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
7344, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Kyyrä, Tomi & Tuomala, Juha, 2013. "Does experience rating reduce disability inflow?," Working Papers 46, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
- Pierre Koning, 2004.
"Estimating the impact of experience rating on the inflow into disability insurance in the Netherlands,"
CPB Discussion Paper
37, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- P. Koning, 2005. "Estimating the Impact of Experience Rating on the Inflow into Disability Insurance in the Netherlands," Working Papers 05-07, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Danzon, Patricia M & Harrington, Scott E, 2001. "Worker's Compensation Rate Regulation: How Price Controls Increase Costs," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 1-36, April.
- Guylaine Baril & Paul Lanoie, 1996. "Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral Hazard in Workers' Compensation : The Canadian Context," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-05, CIRANO.
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