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Internal and external discipline following securities class actions

Listed author(s):
  • Humphery-Jenner, Mark L.

Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm CEOs’ future job-prospects.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957311000386
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Intermediation.

Volume (Year): 21 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 151-179

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:21:y:2012:i:1:p:151-179
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2011.09.001
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622875

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