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CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada

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  • Xianming Zhou

Abstract

Executive compensation of 755 Canadian firms is examined over the period 1991-95, and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies: CEO pay rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance. In addition, executives in utilities earn lower pay, and their compensation is less responsive to performance, than is true for their counterparts in other industries. Some novel findings are also documented. First, the sales elasticity of CEO compensation is greater in larger firms. Second, while CEO turnover probability is generally negatively related to the firm's stock performance, the threat of dismissal appear to be less pronounced in small firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Xianming Zhou, 2000. "CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 213-251, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:1:p:213-251
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Corporate Governance in China: Evidence from Firms Listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(4), pages 945-983, July.
    2. Matousek, Roman & Tzeremes, Nickolaos G., 2016. "CEO compensation and bank efficiency: An application of conditional nonparametric frontiers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(1), pages 264-273.
    3. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from New Micro Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1914, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Eri Nakamura, 2014. "Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance: empirical analysis of Japanese firms’ behavior," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(1), pages 245-284, February.
    5. Chen, Jing & Ezzamel, Mahmoud & Cai, Ziming, 2011. "Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1176-1199, September.
    6. Powers, Eric A., 2005. "Interpreting logit regressions with interaction terms: an application to the management turnover literature," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 504-522, June.
    7. Humphery-Jenner, M., 2011. "Internal and External Discipline Following Securities Class Actions," Discussion Paper 2011-044, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Cornell, Bradford, 2004. "Compensation and recruiting: private universities versus private corporations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 37-52, January.
    9. Soriano-Hernández, P. & del Castillo-Mussot, M. & Campirán-Chávez, I. & Montemayor-Aldrete, J.A., 2017. "Wealth of the world’s richest publicly traded companies per industry and per employee: Gamma, Log-normal and Pareto power-law as universal distributions?," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 471(C), pages 733-749.
    10. Kato, Takao & Long, Cheryl, 2006. "CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 796-817, December.
    11. Yu, Chih-Ping, 2015. "Financial policies on firm performance: The U.S. insurance industry before and after the global financial crisis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 391-402.
    12. Humphery-Jenner, Mark L., 2012. "Internal and external discipline following securities class actions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 151-179.
    13. Siegert, Caspar, 2014. "Bonuses and managerial misbehaviour," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 93-105.
    14. repec:bla:afrdev:v:29:y:2017:i:3:p:429-445 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. W. Stanley Siebert & Nikolay Zubanov, 2010. "Management Economics in a Large Retail Company," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(8), pages 1398-1414, August.
    16. Siebert, W. Stanley & Zubanov, Nick, 2008. "Management Economics in a Large Retail Organization," IZA Discussion Papers 3645, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    17. repec:eee:jfinec:v:127:y:2018:i:2:p:285-302 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Duffhues, Pieter & Kabir, Rezaul, 2008. "Is the pay-performance relationship always positive: Evidence from the Netherlands," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 45-60, February.
    19. Fan, Dennis K.K. & Lau, Chung-Ming & Young, Michael, 2007. "Is China's corporate governance beginning to come of age? The case of CEO turnover," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 105-120, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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