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The Costs of Entrenched Boards

Author

Listed:
  • Lucian Bebchuk

    (Harvard)

Abstract

This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is overall affected by arrangements protecting management from removal. A majority of U.S. public companies have staggered boards that substantially insulate the board from removal via a hostile takeover or a proxy contest. We find that staggered boards are associated with an economically significant reduction in firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). We also find evidence consistent with staggered boards' bringing about, and not merely reflecting, a lower firm value. Finally, the correlation with reduced firm value is stronger for staggered boards established in the corporate charter (which shareholders cannot amend) than for staggered boards established in the company's bylaws (which can be amended by shareholders).
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Lucian Bebchuk, "undated". "The Costs of Entrenched Boards," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1091, American Law & Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:bep:alecam:1091
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    File URL: http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1091&context=alea
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    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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