IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v68y2003i2p233-262.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

CEO reputation and stock-based compensation

Author

Listed:
  • Milbourn, Todd T.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Milbourn, Todd T., 2003. "CEO reputation and stock-based compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 233-262, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:68:y:2003:i:2:p:233-262
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-405X(03)00066-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
    2. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
    3. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    4. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    5. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
    6. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    7. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Weisbach, Michael S, 1998. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 96-118, March.
    8. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
    9. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    10. Elazar Berkovitch & Ronen Israel & Yossef Spiegel, 2000. "Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(4), pages 549-584, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Falato & Dalida Kadyrzhanova, 2012. "CEO successions and firm performance in the US financial industry," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-79, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Albuquerque, Ana M. & De Franco, Gus & Verdi, Rodrigo S., 2013. "Peer choice in CEO compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 160-181.
    3. Humphery-Jenner, Mark L., 2012. "Internal and external discipline following securities class actions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 151-179.
    4. Custódio, Cláudia & Ferreira, Miguel A. & Matos, Pedro, 2013. "Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 471-492.
    5. Jiang, Zhan & Kim, Kenneth A. & Zhang, Hao, 2014. "The effects of corporate bailout on firm performance: International evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 78-96.
    6. Massa, Massimo & Zhang, Lei, 2009. "Cosmetic mergers: The effect of style investing on the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 400-427, September.
    7. Baranchuk, Nina & Chib, Siddhartha, 2008. "Assessing the role of option grants to CEOs: How important is heterogeneity?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 145-166, March.
    8. Jian, Ming & Lee, Kin Wai, 2011. "Does CEO reputation matter for capital investments?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 929-946, September.
    9. Khoroshilov, Yuri & Narayanan, M.P., 2008. "The role of profit-based and stock-based components in incentive compensation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 357-378, July.
    10. Li, Feng & Srinivasan, Suraj, 2011. "Corporate governance when founders are directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 454-469.
    11. Borghesi, Richard & Houston, Joel F. & Naranjo, Andy, 2014. "Corporate socially responsible investments: CEO altruism, reputation, and shareholder interests," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 164-181.
    12. Scott Fung & Hoje Jo & Shih-Chuan Tsai, 2009. "Agency problems in stock market-driven acquisitions," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 8(4), pages 388-430, October.
    13. Kang, Qiang & Liu, Qiao, 2008. "Stock trading, information production, and executive incentives," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 484-498, September.
    14. Wu, Yan Wendy, 2011. "Optimal executive compensation: Stock options or restricted stocks," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 633-644, October.
    15. Garvey, Gerald T. & Milbourn, Todd T., 2006. "Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 197-225, October.
    16. Waldron, Theodore L. & Graffin, Scott D. & Porac, Joseph F. & Wade, James B., 2013. "Third-party endorsements of CEO quality, managerial discretion, and stakeholder reactions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 66(12), pages 2592-2599.
    17. Hodge, Frank & Hopkins, Patrick E. & Pratt, Jamie, 2006. "Management reporting incentives and classification credibility: The effects of reporting discretion and reputation," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 623-634, October.
    18. Shahbaz Sheikh, 2012. "Do CEO compensation incentives affect firm innovation?," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 11(1), pages 4-39, February.
    19. Taylor, Lucian A., 2013. "CEO wage dynamics: Estimates from a learning model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 79-98.
    20. Yudan Zheng, 2010. "The effect of CEO tenure on CEO compensation: Evidence from inside CEOs vs outside CEOs," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 36(10), pages 832-859, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:68:y:2003:i:2:p:233-262. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.