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To bail-out or to bail-in? Answers from an agent-based model

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  • Klimek, Peter
  • Poledna, Sebastian
  • Doyne Farmer, J.
  • Thurner, Stefan

Abstract

Since the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis almost half a trillion euros have been spent to financially assist EU member states in taxpayer-funded bail-outs. These crisis resolutions are often accompanied by austerity programs causing political and social friction on both domestic and international levels. The question of how to resolve failing financial institutions, and how this depends on economic preconditions, is therefore a pressing and controversial issue of vast political importance. In this work we employ an agent-based model to study the economic and financial ramifications of three highly relevant crisis resolution mechanisms. To establish the validity of the model we show that it reproduces a series of key stylized facts of the financial and real economy. The distressed institution can either be closed via a purchase & assumption transaction, it can be bailed-out using taxpayer money, or it may be bailed-in in a debt-to-equity conversion. We find that for an economy characterized by low unemployment and high productivity the optimal crisis resolution with respect to financial stability and economic productivity is to close the distressed institution. For economies in recession with high unemployment the bail-in tool provides the most efficient crisis resolution mechanism. Under no circumstances do taxpayer-funded bail-out schemes outperform bail-ins with private sector involvement.

Suggested Citation

  • Klimek, Peter & Poledna, Sebastian & Doyne Farmer, J. & Thurner, Stefan, 2015. "To bail-out or to bail-in? Answers from an agent-based model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 144-154.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:50:y:2015:i:c:p:144-154
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2014.08.020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marko Petrovic & Bulent Ozel & Andrea Teglio & Marco Raberto & Silvano Cincotti, 2017. "Eurace Open: An agent-based multi-country model," Working Papers 2017/09, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    2. Popoyan, Lilit & Napoletano, Mauro & Roventini, Andrea, 2017. "Taming macroeconomic instability: Monetary and macro-prudential policy interactions in an agent-based model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 117-140.
    3. Giorgio Fagiolo & Andrea Roventini, 2017. "Macroeconomic Policy in DSGE and Agent-Based Models Redux: New Developments and Challenges Ahead," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 20(1), pages 1-1.
    4. Yuanying Guan & Micah Pollak, 2016. "Contagion In Heterogeneous Financial Networks," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(01n02), pages 1-25, February.
    5. Poledna, Sebastian & Molina-Borboa, José Luis & Martínez-Jaramillo, Serafín & van der Leij, Marco & Thurner, Stefan, 2015. "The multi-layer network nature of systemic risk and its implications for the costs of financial crises," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 70-81.
    6. Kok, Christoffer & Hałaj, Grzegorz & Hüser, Anne-Caroline & Perales, Cristian & van der Kraaij, Anton, 2017. "The systemic implications of bail-in: a multi-layered network approach," Working Paper Series 2010, European Central Bank.
    7. Annika Westphal, 2015. "Systemic Risk in the European Union: A Network Approach to Banks’ Sovereign Debt Exposures," International Journal of Financial Studies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(3), pages 1-36, July.
    8. Beck, Thorsten & Da-Rocha-Lopes, Samuel & Silva, Andre, 2017. "Sharing the Pain? Credit Supply and Real Effects of Bank Bail-ins," CEPR Discussion Papers 12058, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Poledna, Sebastian & Bochmann, Olaf & Thurner, Stefan, 2017. "Basel III capital surcharges for G-SIBs are far less effective in managing systemic risk in comparison to network-based, systemic risk-dependent financial transaction taxes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 230-246.
    10. Lorenzo Pandolfi, 2018. "Bail-in vs. Bailout: a False Dilemma?," CSEF Working Papers 499, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    11. João Silvestre, 2017. "Sovereign default contagion: an agent-based model approach," Working Papers Department of Economics 2017/08, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
    12. Marco Raberto & Bulent Ozel & Linda Ponta & Andrea Teglio & Silvano Cincotti, 2016. "From financial instability to green finance: the role of banking and monetary policies in the Eurace model," Working Papers 2016/07, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    13. Andrea Teglio & Andrea Mazzocchetti & Linda Ponta & Marco Raberto & Silvano Cincotti, 2015. "Budgetary rigour with stimulus in lean times: Policy advices from an agent-based model," Working Papers 2015/07, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    14. repec:bla:rdevec:v:21:y:2017:i:3:p:713-730 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. De Caux, Robert & McGroarty, Frank & Brede, Markus, 2017. "The evolution of risk and bailout strategy in banking systems," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 468(C), pages 109-118.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agent-based model; Bail-in; Bail-out; Crisis resolution;

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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