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UK Vice Chancellor compensation: Do they get what they deserve?

Author

Listed:
  • Lucey, Brian
  • Urquhart, Andrew
  • Zhang, Hanxiong

Abstract

The compensation received by UK Vice Chancellors (VCs) has been on an upward trend in recent years and attracted a lot of negative media attention. In this paper, we examine whether VCs receive the compensation they deserve. Using a panel dataset covering the academic years 2007/2008 to 2018/2019, we develop a model to predict expected VC compensation to determine whether VCs are over- or undercompensated. Our model finds that VCs are not overcompensated regarding their base salary, but some are overcompensated in terms of their benefits and pension contributions. However, there is very little difference in terms of characteristics of over- and undercompensated VCs, indicating that on average, UK VCs receive the compensation they deserve. For robustness purposes, we employ a variety of alternative model specifications and subsamples which all support our previous findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucey, Brian & Urquhart, Andrew & Zhang, Hanxiong, 2022. "UK Vice Chancellor compensation: Do they get what they deserve?," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(4).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:bracre:v:54:y:2022:i:4:s0890838922000373
    DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2022.101108
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vice chancellors; Compensation; Pay gap; Performance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General

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