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Gender Differences in Executive Compensation and Job Mobility

Listed author(s):
  • George-Levi Gayle
  • Limor Golan
  • Robert A. Miller

Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation. We find, controlling for executive rank and background, that women earn higher compensation than men, experience more income uncertainty, and are promoted more quickly. Among survivors, being female increases the chance of becoming chief executive officer. The unconditional gender pay gap and job-rank differences are primarily attributable to female executives exiting the occupation at higher rates than men.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/666615
Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/666615
Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 30 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 829-872

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:doi:10.1086/666615
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/

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  1. George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, "undated". "Promotion, Turover and Compensation in the Executive Market," GSIA Working Papers 2008-E32, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
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  8. George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan, "undated". "Estimating a Dynamic Adverse Selection Model: Labor Force Experience and the Changing Gender Earnings Gap 1968-93," GSIA Working Papers 2006-E40, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  9. Margiotta, Mary M & Miller, Robert A, 2000. "Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(3), pages 669-719, August.
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  17. Pekkarinen, Tuomas & Vartiainen, Juhana, 2004. "Gender Differences in Job Assignment and Promotion on a Complexity Ladder of Jobs," IZA Discussion Papers 1184, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  18. Richard Startz & Lundberg, "undated". "Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 19-81, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  19. Claudia Olivetti & Stefania Albanesi, 2007. "Gender And Dynamic Agency: Theory And Evidence On The Compensation Of Female Top Executives," 2007 Meeting Papers 894, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  20. Marianne Bertrand & Kevin F. Hallock, 2001. "The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 55(1), pages 3-21, October.
  21. Larry D. Singell & John M. McDowell & James P. Ziliak, 1999. "Cracks in the Glass Ceiling: Gender and Promotion in the Economics Profession," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 392-396, May.
  22. George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Wage Policy of a Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 921-955.
  23. George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2009. "Insider Information and Performance Pay," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 55(3-4), pages 515-541.
  24. Bell, Linda A., 2005. "Women-Led Firms and the Gender Gap in Top Executive Jobs," IZA Discussion Papers 1689, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  25. O'Neill, June & Polachek, Solomon, 1993. "Why the Gender Gap in Wages Narrowed in the 1980s," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(1), pages 205-228, January.
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  27. Alison J. Wellington, 1993. "Changes in the Male/Female Wage Gap, 1976-85," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 28(2), pages 383-411.
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