Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard
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- Adam Copeland & Cyril Monnet, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 93-113.
- George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2009.
"Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1740-1769, December.
- George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2005. "Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?," GSIA Working Papers 2005-E58, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, 2012.
"Gender Differences in Executive Compensation and Job Mobility,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(4), pages 829-872.
- George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert Miller, 2011. "Gender Differences in Executive Compensation and Job Mobility," Working Papers 2011-013, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, "undated".
"Promotion, Turover and Compensation in the Executive Market,"
GSIA Working Papers
2008-E32, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, 2009. "Promotion, Turnover and Compensation in the Executive Market," 2009 Meeting Papers 118, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Zheng, Xiaoyong & Vukina, Tomislav, 2007. "Efficiency gains from organizational innovation: Comparing ordinal and cardinal tournament games in broiler contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 843-859, August.
- Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 265-300.
- Brenner, Steffen, 2011. "On the irrelevance of insider trading for managerial compensation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 293-303, February.
- George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert Miller, "undated". "Are There Glass Ceilings for Female Executives?," GSIA Working Papers -1969975920, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Bin R. Chen & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2013. "Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 665-698, June.
- Brown, Zachary S. & Bellemare, Marc F., 2009. "The Structural Estimation of Principal-Agent Models by Least Squares: Evidence from Land Tenancy in Madagascar," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49368, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002.
"Testing Contract Theory : A Survey of Some Recent Work,"
2002-11, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Pierre AndrÃ© Chiappori & Bernard SalaniÃ©, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work," CESifo Working Paper Series 738, CESifo Group Munich.
- Gayle, George-Levi & Golan, Limor & Miller, Robert A., 2015. "Interlocked Executives and Insider Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 2015-40, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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