IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/ordojb/v62y2011i1p387-404n17.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Scham- und Schuldgefühl: Zur ökonomischen Bedeutung zweier kulturell motivierter Emotionen / Shame and Guilt: On the economic meaning of two emotions gained with culture

Author

Listed:
  • Sell Friedrich L.

Abstract

In this paper, we intend to clear in the first place, how today’s sciences of psychology and sociology define and understand shame and guilt. In a second step, we document how experimental and psychological game theories as well as traditional economic theory intend to detect the occurrence of shame and guilt. Now as it stands, both the political economy of emotions, the psychological game theory and experimental economics seem to show a great deal of insecurity and lack of sharpness when making use of these two notions. Thereafter, we discuss the guidance and the selection functions which are associated with the feelings of shame and guilt during competition on markets and/or as a part of bargaining processes. Finally, we ask whether it could become a task for policy makers to take action vis-à-vis the emotions of shame and guilt by means of a weak paternalism. Conclusions and the scope for future research end the article.

Suggested Citation

  • Sell Friedrich L., 2011. "Scham- und Schuldgefühl: Zur ökonomischen Bedeutung zweier kulturell motivierter Emotionen / Shame and Guilt: On the economic meaning of two emotions gained with culture," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 62(1), pages 387-404, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:387-404:n:17
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2011-0117
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/ordo-2011-0117
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/ordo-2011-0117?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2006. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms, and Social Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(4), pages 1473-1503.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    3. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    4. Kartik B. Athreya, 2004. "Shame as it ever was : stigma and personal bankruptcy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 90(Spr), pages 1-19.
    5. Glaeser, Edward L., 2006. "Paternalism and Psychology," Working Paper Series rwp06-006, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    6. Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka, 2008. "The Role of Stigma in the Design of Welfare Programs," CESifo Working Paper Series 2305, CESifo.
    7. Blumkin, Tomer & Margalioth, Yoram & Sadka, Efraim, 2008. "The Role of Stigma in the Design of Welfare Programs," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275714, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    8. Friedrich Sell & Marcus Wiens, 2009. "Warum Vertrauen wichtig ist — Der ökonomische Blickwinkel," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 89(8), pages 526-533, August.
    9. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises and Partnership," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
    10. Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2009. "Tax revenues, fiscal corruption and "shame" costs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1239-1244, November.
    11. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2006. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, in: S. Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 615-691, Elsevier.
    12. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March.
    13. Grund, Christian, 1999. "Stigma effects of layoffs?: Evidence from German micro-data," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 241-247, August.
    14. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka & Yoram Margalioth, 2008. "The Role of Stigma in the Design of Welfare Programs," Working Papers 0806, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    15. Omori, Yoshiaki, 1997. "Stigma Effects of Nonemployment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 394-416, April.
    16. Biewen, Martin & Steffes, Susanne, 2010. "Unemployment persistence: Is there evidence for stigma effects?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 188-190, March.
    17. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2007. "Guilt in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 170-176, May.
    18. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    19. Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 2008. "Nonemployment stigma as rational herding: A field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 30-40, January.
    20. Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-219, Spring.
    21. Diego Zavaleta Reyles, 2007. "The Ability to go about Without Shame: A Proposal for Internationally Comparable Indicators of Shame and Humiliation," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(4), pages 405-430.
    22. Kim, Youngse, 2003. "Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model of tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1591-1616, August.
    23. Güth, Werner & Ploner, Matteo & Regner, Tobias, 2009. "Determinants of in-group bias: Is group affiliation mediated by guilt-aversion?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 814-827, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dhami, Sanjit & Wei, Mengxing & al-Nowaihi, Ali, 2019. "Public goods games and psychological utility: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 361-390.
    2. Maroš Servátka & Steven Tucker & Radovan Vadovič, 2011. "Building Trust—One Gift at a Time," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(4), pages 1-22, September.
    3. Bruttel, Lisa & Stolley, Florian, 2020. "Getting a yes. An experiment on the power of asking," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    4. Alexander Morell, 2014. "The Short Arm of Guilt: Guilt Aversion Plays Out More Across a Short Social Distance," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_19, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Dec 2016.
    5. Roman Inderst & Kiryl Khalmetski & Axel Ockenfels, 2019. "Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(7), pages 3322-3336, July.
    6. Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc, 2021. "Simple guilt and cooperation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    7. Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition," Working Papers 2009-03, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    8. Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2015. "The geometry of distributional preferences and a non-parametric identification approach: The Equality Equivalence Test," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 85-103.
    9. Murnighan, J. Keith & Wang, Long, 2016. "The social world as an experimental game," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 80-94.
    10. Holzmeister, F. & Kerschbamer, R., 2019. "oTree: The Equality Equivalence Test," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 214-222.
    11. Riccardo Ghidoni & Matteo Ploner, 2014. "When do the Expectations of Others Matter? An Experiment on Distributional Justice and Guilt Aversion," CEEL Working Papers 1403, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    12. Sanjit Dhami, 2017. "Human Ethics and Virtues: Rethinking the Homo-Economicus Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 6836, CESifo.
    13. ATTANASI Giuseppe & NAGEL Rosemarie, 2008. "A Survey of Psychological Games: Theoretical Findings and Experimental Evidence," LERNA Working Papers 08.07.251, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    14. Christine Laudenbach & Jenny Pirschel & Stephan Siegel, 2018. "Personal Communication in an Automated World: Evidence from Loan Repayments," CESifo Working Paper Series 7295, CESifo.
    15. Upravitelev, A., 2023. "Neoclassical roots of behavioral economics," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 58(1), pages 110-140.
    16. Ederer, Florian & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2017. "Promises and expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 161-178.
    17. Sandro Casal & Matteo Ploner & Alec N. Sproten, 2019. "Fostering The Best Execution Regime: An Experiment About Pecuniary Sanctions And Accountability In Fiduciary Money Management," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 600-616, January.
    18. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Embezzlement and guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 409-429.
    19. Daniel Woods & Maroš Servátka, 2019. "Nice to you, nicer to me: Does self-serving generosity diminish the reciprocal response?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 506-529, June.
    20. Khalmetski, Kiryl & Ockenfels, Axel & Werner, Peter, 2015. "Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 163-208.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:387-404:n:17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.