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Do trade flows respond to nudges? Evidence from the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism

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  • David J. Kuenzel

Abstract

Relatively little is known about the economic effects of WTO members’ communications outside of official negotiations and dispute proceedings. This paper considers whether interactions between members through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, the WTO’s prime transparency institution, lead to subsequent changes in bilateral trade flows. Trade policy concern submissions are more likely to lead to positive trade responses when (i) the receiving country is less concerned about terms‐of‐trade losses, (ii) the submitter is more willing to engage in WTO disputes with the reviewed member to challenge controversial trade policies, and (iii) the submitting country challenges trade policies in the nonchemical manufacturing sector. Nudges through the TPR process are not successful in raising agricultural trade.

Suggested Citation

  • David J. Kuenzel, 2019. "Do trade flows respond to nudges? Evidence from the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 735-764, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:27:y:2019:i:3:p:735-764
    DOI: 10.1111/roie.12394
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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