Universal Mechanisms

Citations

Cited by:

1. Nathalie Greenan & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Patricia Crifo, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 164(3), pages 27-55.
   • Patricia Crifo & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(3), pages 27-55.
   • Patricia Crifo & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03898034, HAL.
   • Patricia Crifo & Marc-Arthur Diaye & Nathalie Greenan, 2004. "Pourquoi les entreprises évaluent-elles individuellement leurs salariés ?," Post-Print hal-03898034, HAL.
2. , & ,, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
   • Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/35, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543604, HAL.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543605, HAL.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543571, HAL.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543601, HAL.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543608, HAL.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543602, HAL.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543607, HAL.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543603, HAL.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543606, HAL.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2009. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00495923, HAL.
   • Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," HEC Research Papers Series 926, HEC Paris.
   • Tristan Tomala & Ludovic Renou, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Working Papers hal-00540799, HAL.
   • Tristan Tomala & L. Renou, 2010. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Post-Print hal-00543609, HAL.
3. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.
   • Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers 9624, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
   • F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996. "Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," THEMA Working Papers 96-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
4. Eilon Solan, 2000. "Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games," Discussion Papers 1298, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
5. Hasker, Kevin, 2000. "Social Norms and Choice: A Weak Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games," Working Papers 2000-10, Rice University, Department of Economics.
6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6031 is not listed on IDEAS
7. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
   • Vida, P ter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
8. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
9. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
   • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
10. Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989. "Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June.
    • Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
11. Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Abraham Neyman, 2006. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1603-1636, November.
    • Olivier Gossner & Penelope Hernandez & Abraham Neyman, 2004. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Discussion Paper Series dp377, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    • Olivier Gossner & Abraham Neyman & Penélope Hernández, 2005. "Optimal Use Of Communication Resources," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Olivier Gossner & Pénélope Hernández & Abraham Neyman, 2006. "Optimal use of communication resources," Post-Print halshs-00754118, HAL.
12. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    • Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo.
    • Vida Peter & Francoise Forges, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: the two-player case," Post-Print hal-01252955, HAL.
13. Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004. "Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
    • José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998. "- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
14. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics.
15. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2023. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-14, June.
    • Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2005. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, revised Nov 2009.
16. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
    • FORGES, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Francoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," Post-Print hal-00360743, HAL.
17. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
18. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
    • Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Post-Print hal-00360719, HAL.
    • Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo.
    • Frédéric Koessler & Francoise Forges, 2008. "Long persuasion games," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00360719, HAL.
19. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
20. Blume, Andreas, 2012. "A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 510-517.
21. Gerardi, Dino & Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 104-134, July.
    • Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson, 2005. "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1542, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
22. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
    • Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2012. "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20121, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
23. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
    • Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008.
24. Zhuozheng Li & Huanxing Yang & Lan Zhang, 2019. "Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 109-141, March.
25. Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Working Papers 2005-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    • Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Robedrto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Discussion Papers 05-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    • Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2005. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we057238, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," Working Papers 2007-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
26. GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • O. Gossner, 1999. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," THEMA Working Papers 99-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Gossner, O., 1999. "Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players," Papers 99-07, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
27. Francisco Silva, 2023. "Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(3), pages 720-737, July.
28. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
29. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
    • Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 2, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
30. Gossner, Olivier, 1998. "Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 69-89, November.
    • GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997. "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1361, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
31. Bach, Christian W. & Perea, Andrés, 2020. "Two definitions of correlated equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 12-24.
32. Izmalkov, Sergei & Lepinski, Matt & Micali, Silvio, 2011. "Perfect implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-140, January.
    • Sergei Izmalkov & Matt Lepinski & Silvio Micali, 2010. "Perfect Implementation," Working Papers w0140, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
33. Rabah Amir & Sergei Belkov & Igor V. Evstigneev, 2017. "Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(4), pages 457-468, December.
    • Rabah Amir & Sergei Belkov & Igor V. Evstigneev, 2017. "Correlated Equilibrium in a Nutshell," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1706, Economics, The University of Manchester.
34. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: A General Model," Working Papers of BETA 2002-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
35. Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
36. Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
37. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    • Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
38. Vijay Krishna, R., 2007. "Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 584-592, January.
39. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
    • Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2010. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," MPRA Paper 25895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Post-Print hal-00715606, HAL.
40. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
    • Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
41. Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Eliciting information from multiple experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-160, October.
    • Asher Wolinsky, 1999. "Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts," Discussion Papers 1277, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
42. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
43. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
    • Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1994. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Discussion Papers 1108, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
44. Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
45. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
    • F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
46. Olivier Gossner, 1997. "Protocoles de communication robustes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 685-695.
47. Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 475-502, June.
    • Renault, Jérôme & Forges, Françoise, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval," TSE Working Papers 21-1216, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Françoise Forges & Jérôme Renault, 2021. "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval," Post-Print hal-02440627, HAL.
48. Julian Jamison, 2020. "Valuable Cheap Talk and Equilibrium Selection," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-14, August.
49. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Sep 1996.
50. Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2017. "A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 9-19, April.
51. Michele Crescenzi, 2022. "Coordination through ambiguous language," Papers 2211.03426, arXiv.org.
52. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
53. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
54. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
55. Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
56. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.