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Citations for "Universal mechanisms"

by Forges, F.

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1. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
   
   • Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2010. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," MPRA Paper 25895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
2. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, . "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/168, Université Paris-Dauphine.
   
   • Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
   • F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
3. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
   
   • FORGES, Françoise, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited," CORE Discussion Papers 2006041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
4. Chirantan Ganguly and Indrajit Ray, . "Can Mediation Improve Upon Cheap-Talk? A Note," Discussion Papers 05-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
5. Izmalkov, Sergei & Lepinski, Matt & Micali, Silvio, 2011. "Perfect implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-140, January.
   
   • Sergei Izmalkov & Matt Lepinski & Silvio Micali, 2010. "Perfect Implementation," Working Papers w0140, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
6. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
   
   • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
7. Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008.
   
   • Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
8. Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," Working Papers 2007-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
   
   • Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria As A Difficulty In Understanding Correlated Distributions," Economics Working Papers we057238, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
   • Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, . "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/366, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
   • Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Working Papers 2005-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
   • Anirban Kar, Indrajit Ray and Robedrto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Discussion Papers 05-18, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
9. F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996. "Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," THEMA Working Papers 96-24, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
   
   • Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.
   • Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers 9624, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
10. Hasker, Kevin, 2000. "Social Norms and Choice: A Weak Folk Theorem for Repeated Matching Games," Working Papers 2000-10, Rice University, Department of Economics.
11. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 2, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    
    • Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
    • Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
12. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    
    • Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989. "Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June.
13. Forges, Françoise, 2012. "Correlated equilibria and communication in games," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/171, Université Paris-Dauphine.
14. Gossner, Olivier, 1998. "Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 69-89, November.
    
    • GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997. "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," CORE Discussion Papers 1997092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
15. Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavlov, 2008. "How to Talk to Multiple Audiences," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20081, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    
    • Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
16. José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano, 1998. "- Unmediated Communication In Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-27, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    
    • Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004. "Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
17. Eilon Solan, 2000. "Rationality and Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria in Stochastic Games," Discussion Papers 1298, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
18. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
19. Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    
    • Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
    • Francoise Forges & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1669, CESifo Group Munich.
    • Koessler, Frédéric & Forges, Françoise, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/179, Université Paris-Dauphine.
20. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    
    • Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Les Cahiers de Recherche 926, HEC Paris.
    • Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Mechanism Design and Communication Networks," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/35, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
21. Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson, 2005. "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1542, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    
    • Gerardi, Dino & Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 104-134, July.
22. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
    
    • Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1994. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Discussion Papers 1108, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
23. Olivier Gossner & Abraham Neyman & Penélope Hernández, 2005. "Optimal Use Of Communication Resources," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    
    • Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Abraham Neyman, 2006. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1603-1636, November.
    • Olivier Gossner & Penelope Hernandez & Abraham Neyman, 2004. "Optimal Use of Communication Resources," Discussion Paper Series dp377, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
24. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: A General Model," Working Papers of BETA 2002-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
25. Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo Group Munich.
    
    • Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
26. GOSSNER , Olivier & VIEILLE, Nicolas, 1998. "Repeated communication through the mechanism “and”," CORE Discussion Papers 1998056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    
    • Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2001. "Repeated Communication Through the Mechanism And," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/6031, Université Paris-Dauphine.
27. Gossner, O., 1999. "Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players," Papers 99-07, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    
    • O. Gossner, 1999. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," THEMA Working Papers 99-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," CORE Discussion Papers 1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
28. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0511, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
29. Wagner, P.Achim, 2011. "Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 99-107, January.
30. Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
31. Blume, A. & De Jong, D.V. & Kim, Y.G. & Sprinkle, G.B., 1994. "Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games: An Experiment," Papers 9491, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    
    • Blume, A., 1994. "Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games : An Experiment," Discussion Paper 1994-91, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
32. Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Eliciting information from multiple experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-160, October.
    
    • Asher Wolinsky, 1999. "Eliciting Information From Multiple Experts," Discussion Papers 1277, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
33. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
34. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics.
35. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
36. Vijay Krishna, R., 2007. "Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 584-592, January.
37. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.

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