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Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices

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Cited by:

  1. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2016. "On Communication and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 285-315, February.
  2. Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 2019. "Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(6), pages 3018-3069.
  3. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica, 2021. "Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 47-64, February.
  4. Tobias Salz & Emanuel Vespa, 2020. "Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 447-469, June.
  5. Jehiel, Philippe & Samuelson, Larry, 2023. "The analogical foundations of cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  6. Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1759-1772.
  7. Abito, Jose Miguel & Chen, Cuicui, 2023. "A partial identification framework for dynamic games," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
  8. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2023. "Self-evident events and the value of linking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  9. Joyee Deb & Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee, 2015. "Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1995, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  10. Sebastian Kranz, 2013. "Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000676, David K. Levine.
  11. Mouraviev, Igor, 2014. "Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 494, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  12. David Spector, 2015. "Facilitating collusion by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports," Working Papers halshs-01119959, HAL.
  13. Nicholas Economides, 2014. "Bundling and Tying," Working Papers 14-22, NET Institute.
  14. Suehyun Kwon, 2016. "Competing Mechanisms with Limited Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series 6280, CESifo.
  15. , H. & ,, 2016. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  16. Thomas Bourveau & Guoman She & Alminas Žaldokas, 2020. "Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 295-332, May.
  17. Mitsuru Igami & Takuo Sugaya, 2022. "Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990–99 [“Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames”]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(3), pages 1460-1494.
  18. Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2019. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(5), pages 2269-2300.
  19. Bos Iwan & Letterie Wilko & Vermeulen Dries, 2015. "Antitrust as Facilitating Factor for Collusion," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 797-814, April.
  20. Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2020. "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(10), pages 4433-4454, October.
  21. Susanne Goldlücke & Sebastian Kranz, 2018. "Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 235-263, July.
  22. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2014. "Collusion under Private Monitoring with Asymmetric Capacity Constraints," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2014-04, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  23. Francesco Decarolis & Gabriele Rovigatti, 2017. "Online Auctions and Digital Marketing Agencies," Working Papers 17-08, NET Institute.
  24. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03760756, HAL.
  25. Dvorak, Fabian & Fehrler, Sebastian, 2018. "Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions," IZA Discussion Papers 11897, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  26. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2015. "Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 188-211.
  27. Tim Reuter, 2017. "Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 51(3), pages 291-313, November.
  28. Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2017. "Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 654-682, September.
  29. van den Berg, Anita & Bos, Iwan, 2017. "Collusion in a price-quantity oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 159-185.
  30. Harrington, Joseph E., 2017. "A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 140-158.
  31. Ismail Saglam, 2020. "Bargaining over collusion: the threat of supply function versus Cournot competition under demand uncertainty and cost asymmetry," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 671-693, October.
  32. Porter, Robert H., 2020. "Mergers and coordinated effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
  33. Johannes Wachs & J'anos Kert'esz, 2019. "A network approach to cartel detection in public auction markets," Papers 1906.08667, arXiv.org.
  34. Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2014. "Cartel Sales Dynamics when Monitoring for Compliance is More Frequent than Punishment for Non-Compliance," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Martin Peitz & Yossi Spiegel (ed.), THE ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION POLICY AND SECTORAL REGULATION, chapter 7, pages 175-192, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  35. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  36. David Spector, 2017. "Cheap talk, monitoring and collusion," Working Papers hal-01975642, HAL.
  37. Harrington, Joseph E. & Zhao, Wei, 2012. "Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 277-289.
  38. Do, Jihwan, 2022. "Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
  39. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  40. Ricardo Andrés Guzmán & Rodrigo Harrison & Nureya Abarca & Mauricio G. Villena, 2013. "Reciprocity and Trust: Personality Psychology meets Behavioral Economics," Documentos de Trabajo 439, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  41. Salvatore Piccolo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2014. "Debt, Managers and Cartels," CSEF Working Papers 365, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  42. B. Douglas Bernheim & Erik Madsen, 2017. "Price Cutting and Business Stealing in Imperfect Cartels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(2), pages 387-424, February.
  43. Hackbarth, Dirk & Taub, Bart, 2018. "Does the Potential to Merge Reduce Competition?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12732, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  44. Emilio Bisetti & Benjamin Tengelsen & Ariel Zetlin‐Jones, 2022. "Moral Hazard In Remote Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1595-1623, November.
  45. Isaiah Andrews & Daniel Barron, 2016. "The Allocation of Future Business: Dynamic Relational Contracts with Multiple Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2742-2759, September.
  46. Iwan Bos & Ronald Peeters & Erik Pot, 2013. "Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(6), pages 611-614, April.
  47. David K. Levine, 2021. "Fine cartels," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 155-166, October.
  48. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, 2010. "Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Working Paper Archive 559, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  49. Nikolaus Fink & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler & Konrad Stahl & Christine Zulehner, 2017. "Registered cartels in Austria: an overview," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 385-422, December.
  50. David K Levine, 2020. "Fine Cartels," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001554, David K. Levine.
  51. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Walckiers, Alexis, 2017. "A theory of hub-and-spoke collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 353-370.
  52. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(2), pages 193-216, March.
  53. Lunde, Asger & Sandberg, Rickard & Söderberg, Magnus, 2019. "Calculating the damage of a cartel subject to transition periods: The international uranium cartel in the 1970s," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
  54. Nikolaus Fink, 2016. "Formation and Adaptation of the Sugar Cartel in Austria–Hungary," WIFO Working Papers 508, WIFO.
  55. Jorge Alé‐Chilet & Juan Pablo Atal, 2020. "Trade associations and collusion among many agents: evidence from physicians," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1197-1221, December.
  56. Roux, Catherine & Thöni, Christian, 2015. "Collusion among many firms: The disciplinary power of targeted punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 83-93.
  57. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2016. "Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited," MPRA Paper 74352, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  58. Frieder Mokinski & Nikolas Wölfing, 2014. "The effect of regulatory scrutiny: Asymmetric cost pass-through in power wholesale and its end," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 175-193, April.
  59. Cheng, Long & McDonald, Stuart & Ye, Guangliang, 2023. "Cartelization under present bias and imperfect public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 77-86.
  60. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2020. "Information exchange in cartels," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 421-446, June.
  61. Isogai, Shigeki & Shen, Chaohai, 2023. "Multiproduct firm’s reputation and leniency program in multimarket collusion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
  62. Masaki Aoyagi & V. Bhaskar & Guillaume R. Fréchette, 2019. "The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 1-43, February.
  63. Martin, Simon & Schmal, W. Benedikt, 2021. "Collusive compensation schemes aided by algorithms," DICE Discussion Papers 375, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  64. Odenkirchen, Johannes, 2017. "Pricing Behavior of Cartel Outsiders in Incomplete Cartels," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168309, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  65. Arechar, Antonio A. & Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G., 2017. "“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 726-743.
  66. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2012. "Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1998-2027.
  67. Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova & Gyuzel Yusupova, 2019. "Advance freight rate announcements (GRI) in liner shipping: European and Russian regulatory settlements compared," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 21(2), pages 192-206, June.
  68. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Post-Print halshs-03760756, HAL.
  69. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2018. "Explicit vs tacit collusion: The effects of firm numbers and asymmetries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-25.
  70. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  71. David Spector, 2015. "Facilitating collusion by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports," PSE Working Papers halshs-01119959, HAL.
  72. Soumen Banerjee, 2023. "Combating Algorithmic Collusion: A Mechanism Design Approach," Papers 2303.02576, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
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