Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?
This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.
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Volume (Year): 20 (2013)
Issue (Month): 6 (April)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Martin, Stephen, 2006. "Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1299-1332, November.
- Ola Andersson & Erik Wengström, 2007.
"Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(2), pages 321-339, 06.
- Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2004. "Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies," Working Papers 2004:14, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 13 Sep 2004.
- Paul Klemperer, 1995. "Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 515-539.
- Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak, 2008. "Tacit versus Overt Collusion Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: What’s the Evidence?," Working Papers 08-32, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
- Motta,Massimo, 2004.
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521816632, December.
- McCutcheon, Barbara, 1997. "Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 330-350, April.
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