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Antitrust as facilitating factor for collusion

Author

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  • Bos, A.M.

    (Organisation,Strategy & Entrepreneurship)

  • Letterie, W.A.

    (Organisation,Strategy & Entrepreneurship)

  • Vermeulen, A.J.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

We study collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma when firms' discount factor is private information. If tacit collusion is not feasible, firms that are capable of sustaining high prices may still be willing and able to collude explicitly. Firms eager to collude may signal their intentions when forming the agreement is costly, but not too costly. As antitrust makes explicit collusion costly in expected terms, it may in fact function as a signaling device. We show that there always exists a cost level for which explicit collusion is viable. Moreover, our analysis suggests that antitrust enforcement is unable to fully deter collusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Bos, A.M. & Letterie, W.A. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2013. "Antitrust as facilitating factor for collusion," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013011
    DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2013011
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen Davies & Matthew Olczak, 2008. "Tacit versus Overt Collusion Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: What's the Evidence?," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2008-32, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
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    10. Iwan Bos & Ronald Peeters & Erik Pot, 2013. "Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(6), pages 611-614, April.
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    2. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Crede, Carsten J., 2020. "Post-cartel tacit collusion: Determinants, consequences, and prevention," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    3. Jochem, Annabelle & Parrotta, Pierpaolo & Valletta, Giacomo, 2020. "The impact of the 2002 reform of the EU leniency program on cartel outcomes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    4. Carsten J. Crede & Liang Lu, 2016. "The effects of endogenous enforcement on strategic uncertainty and cartel deterrence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-08, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    5. Napel, Stefan & Welter, Dominik, 2023. "Umbrella pricing and cartel size," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    6. Moritz Birgit & Becker Martin & Schmidtchen Dieter, 2018. "Measuring the Deterrent Effect of European Cartel Law Enforcement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-27, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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