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Integrating Norms, Knowledge, and Social Ties into the Deterrence Model of Cartels: A Survey Study of Business Executives

Author

Listed:
  • Loet Stekelenburg

    (Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM)
    Utrecht University)

  • Peter T. Dijkstra

    (Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM))

  • Elianne F. Steenbergen

    (Utrecht University
    Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), Autoriteit Financiële Markten)

  • Jessanne Mastop

    (Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM))

  • Naomi Ellemers

    (Utrecht University)

Abstract

We expand the rational choice theory of crime, as applied to cartels, with three psychological factors—personal norms, social norms and social ties—and knowledge of competition law. Through a survey of Dutch businesses, we find that adding psychological factors substantially increases the explanatory power of the model: All predict attitudes toward future cartel behavior, with personal norms as the strongest (negative) predictor. Better knowledge of competition law relates to stronger deterrence and norms against collusion. We conclude that psychological factors and knowledge of the law are likely necessary to understand and prevent potential cartel behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Loet Stekelenburg & Peter T. Dijkstra & Elianne F. Steenbergen & Jessanne Mastop & Naomi Ellemers, 2023. "Integrating Norms, Knowledge, and Social Ties into the Deterrence Model of Cartels: A Survey Study of Business Executives," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(3), pages 275-315, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:63:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s11151-023-09909-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09909-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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