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Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion

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  • Martin, Stephen

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  • Martin, Stephen, 2006. "Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1299-1332, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:24:y:2006:i:6:p:1299-1332
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Noncooperative View of Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 12(1), pages 106-122, February.
    2. Clyde, Paul S & Reitzes, James D, 1998. "Market Power and Collusion in the Ocean Shipping Industry: Is a Bigger Cartel a Better Cartel?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(2), pages 292-304, April.
    3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    4. David Genesove & Wallace Mullin, 1999. "The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange," NBER Chapters,in: Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries, pages 103-144 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Hay, George A & Kelley, Daniel, 1974. "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 13-38, April.
    6. David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 2001. "Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 379-398, June.
    7. Souam, Said, 2001. "Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 1-26, January.
    8. Johansen, Leif, 1982. " On the Status of the Nash Type of Noncooperative Equilibrium in Economic Theory," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 84(3), pages 421-441.
    9. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pal, Rupayan & Scrimitore, Marcella, 2016. "Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 266-269.
    2. David BARTOLINI & Alberto ZAZZARO, 2008. "Are Antitrust Fines Friendly to Competition? An Endogenous Coalition Formation Approach to Collusive Cartels," Working Papers 325, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    3. Iwan Bos & Ronald Peeters & Erik Pot, 2013. "Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(6), pages 611-614, April.
    4. Garrod, Luke & Olczak, Matthew, 2016. "Collusion, Firm Numbers and Asymmetries Revisited," MPRA Paper 74352, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Hinloopen, Jeroen, 2006. "Internal cartel stability with time-dependent detection probabilities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1213-1229, November.
    6. José Miguel Benavente & Gustavo Crespi & Alessandro Maffioli, 2007. "Public Support to Firm-Level Innovation: An Evaluation of the FONTEC Program," OVE Working Papers 0507, Inter-American Development Bank, Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE).

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