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The role of monitoring in duopoly market outcomes

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Listed author(s):
  • Holcomb, James H.
  • Nelson, Paul S.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W5H-45FY3HC-29/2/2103cbd65aa9bcf7bd3e59ed4b061465
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).

Volume (Year): 26 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 79-93

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Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:79-93
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175

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  1. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
  2. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
  3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
  4. Hay, George A & Kelley, Daniel, 1974. "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 13-38, April.
  5. Holcomb, James H. & Nelson, Paul S., 1991. "Cartel failure: A mistake or do they do it to each other on purpose?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 235-249.
  6. Osborne, D K, 1971. "The Duopoly Game: Output Variations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 538-560, September.
  7. Roy Radner, 1986. "Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 43-57.
  8. Roy Radner & Roger Myerson & Eric Maskin, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69.
  9. Davidson, Carl & Martin, Lawrence W, 1985. "General Equilibrium Tax Incidence under Imperfect Competition: A Quantity-setting Supergame Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1212-1223, December.
  10. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1991. "Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 183-220, May.
  11. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1989. "Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 568-587, Winter.
  12. Osborne, D K, 1974. "A Duopoly Price Game," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 41(162), pages 157-175, May.
  13. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
  14. R. M. Cyert & M. H. DeGroot, 1970. "Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 410-429.
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Cited by:

  1. Waichman, Israel & Requate, Till & Siang, Ch'ng Kean, 2010. "Pre-play communication in Cournot competition: An experiment with students and managers," Economics Working Papers 2010,09, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  2. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  3. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  4. Masaki Aoyagi & V. Bhaskar & Guillaume R. Frechette, 2015. "The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private," ISER Discussion Paper 0942, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  5. Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume R. Frechette, 2004. "Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000127, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2002:i:6:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Bigoni, Maria & Potters, Jan & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2012. "Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 8877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Aoyagi, Masaki & Fréchette, Guillaume, 2009. "Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1135-1165, May.
  9. John A. List, 2009. "The Economics of Open Air Markets," NBER Working Papers 15420, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Hitoshi Matsushima & Tomohisa Toyama, 2011. "Monitoring Accuracy and Retaliation in Infinitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Theory and Experiments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-795, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

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