The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
This paper describes information exchange under the Sugar Institute, the trade association of U.S. domestic sugar cane refiners, between 1928 and 1936. The Institute collected production and delivery data from the individual firms and returned i t to them in aggregated form. Attempts to exchange sales data were stymied by the larger firms. Surprisingly, there is no indication of misreporting of statistics by Institute members, although statistics were, at times, withheld. The paper concentrates o n the evolution of the Institute. Proposals for successor organizations show that a workable mechanism required greater discretion to the central authority and greater voting right to the larger firms.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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