The Sugar Institute Learns to Organize Information Exchange
This paper describes information exchange under the Sugar Institute, the trade association of U.S. domestic sugar cane refiners, between 1928 and 1936. The Institute collected production and delivery data from the individual firms and returned it to them in aggregated form. Attempts to exchange sales data were stymied by the larger firms. Surprisingly, there is no indication of mis-reporting of statistics by Institute members, although statistics were, at times, withheld. The paper concentrates on the evolution of the Institute. Proposals for successor organizations show that a workable mechanism required greater discretion to the central authority and greater voting rights to the larger firms.
|Date of creation:||Mar 1997|
|Publication status:||published as Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries, Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G. Raff, and Peter Temin, eds., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 103-138.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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