Vertical Restraints in the Bromine Cartel: The Role of Distributors in Facilitating Collusion
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Cited by:
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2006.
"What Determines Cartel Success?,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(1), pages 43-95, March.
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Connor, John M., 1997.
"Archer Daniels Midland: Price Fixer To The World,"
Staff Papers
28653, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- John M. Connor, 2000. "Archer Daniels Midland:Price Fixer To The World," Working Papers 00-11, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- Connor, John M., 2000. "Archer Daniels Midland: Price-Fixer To The World," Staff Papers 28664, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- John M. Connor, 2003.
"Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement,"
Working Papers
03-12, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- Connor, John M., 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, And Anticartel Enforcement," Staff Papers 28645, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- N61 - Economic History - - Manufacturing and Construction - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
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