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Citations for "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players"

by Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew

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  1. Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
  2. George Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," Economics Working Papers 0054, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  3. Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Wallis Working Papers WP33, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Scholarly Articles 3160491, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
  6. Jeffrey C. Ely & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," Discussion Papers 1348, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Monte, Daniel, 2016. "Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 18-21.
  8. Seung Han Yoo, 2013. "A Theory of Group Inequality," Discussion Paper Series 1309, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  9. Walid Hichri & Alan Kirman, 2007. "The Emergence of Coordination in Public Good Games," Post-Print halshs-00161572, HAL.
  10. V. V. Chari & Patrick E. Kehoe, 1990. "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default," IMF Working Papers 90/22, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2004. "Layoffs and Quits in Repeated Games," Economics Series Working Papers 199, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  12. Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew, 2008. "When is Reputation Bad?," Scholarly Articles 3196337, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2010.
  14. M. Sysi-Aho & J. Saramäki & J. Kertész & K. Kaski, 2005. "Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 44(1), pages 129-135, 03.
  15. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  16. Phillip Johnson & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1998. "Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2138, David K. Levine.
  17. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," CARESS Working Papres rep-is-sep, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  18. Chari V. V. & Kehoe Patrick J., 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Debt," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 230-261, December.
  19. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  20. Giulio Federico, 2004. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Development and Comp Systems 0409004, EconWPA.
  21. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
  22. Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 3196334, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  23. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine.
  24. repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001297 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. K. Schmidt, 1999. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests," Levine's Working Paper Archive 626, David K. Levine.
  26. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July.
  27. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2010. "Dismissals and quits in repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 67-80, April.
  28. Per Overgaard, 1992. "Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 169-191, June.
  29. Stahl, Dale O. & Turunen-Red, Arja H., 1995. "Tariff games: Cooperation with random variation in political regimes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 215-238, June.
  30. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
  31. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, EconWPA.
  32. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
  33. J François Outreville, 2010. "The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 2009: In Quest of Behavioural Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 35(3), pages 484-497, July.
  34. I. Lubashevsky & S. Kanemoto, 2010. "Scale-free memory model for multiagent reinforcement learning. Mean field approximation and rock-paper-scissors dynamics," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 76(1), pages 69-85, July.
  35. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
  36. Balanquit, Romeo, 2010. "Tolerance, Cooperation, and Equilibrium Restoration in Repeated Games," MPRA Paper 21877, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  37. Christian Schultz, 2005. "Virtual Capacity and Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1487, CESifo Group Munich.
  38. Roger Lagunoff & Matthew Haag, 2002. "One Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-05, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  39. Qiang Fu & Qian Jiao & Jingfeng Lu, 2011. "On disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 419-434, September.
  40. Majumdar, Mukul & Yoo, Seung Han, 2011. "Strategic Analysis of Influence Peddling," Working Papers 11-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
  41. Zhijian Wang & Yanran Zhou & Jaimie W. Lien & Jie Zheng & Bin Xu, 2016. "Extortion Can Outperform Generosity in the Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001297, UCLA Department of Economics.
  42. Mukul Majumdar & Seung Yoo, 2012. "Strategic analysis of influence peddling," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 737-762, November.
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