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Citations for "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players"

by Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew

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  1. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," CARESS Working Papres rep-is-sep, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  2. Per Overgaard, 1992. "Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 169-191, June.
  3. Seung Han Yoo, 2013. "A Theory of Group Inequality," Discussion Paper Series 1309, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October.
  5. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
  6. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine.
  7. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  8. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2004. "Layoffs and Quits in Repeated Games," Economics Series Working Papers 199, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Majumdar, Mukul & Yoo, Seung Han, 2011. "Strategic Analysis of Influence Peddling," Working Papers 11-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, David K. Levine.
  12. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-778, July.
  13. Jeffrey Ely & Jusso Valimaki, 2002. "Bad Reputation," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000514, www.najecon.org.
  14. Haag, Matthew & Roger Lagunoff, 2003. "On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 97, Royal Economic Society.
  15. Mukul Majumdar & Seung Yoo, 2012. "Strategic analysis of influence peddling," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 737-762, November.
  16. Stahl, Dale O. & Turunen-Red, Arja H., 1995. "Tariff games: Cooperation with random variation in political regimes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 215-238, June.
  17. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  18. J François Outreville, 2010. "The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 2009: In Quest of Behavioural Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 35(3), pages 484-497, July.
  19. Schmidt,Klaus M., 1991. "Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games of conflicting interests," Discussion Paper Serie A 333, University of Bonn, Germany.
  20. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans and mutual default," Staff Report 124, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  21. I. Lubashevsky & S. Kanemoto, 2010. "Scale-free memory model for multiagent reinforcement learning. Mean field approximation and rock-paper-scissors dynamics," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 76(1), pages 69-85, July.
  22. Walid Hichri & Alan Kirman, 2007. "The Emergence of Coordination in Public Good Games," Post-Print halshs-00161572, HAL.
  23. Waknis, Parag, 2014. "A Leviathan central bank: Modeling seigniorage in a money search model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 386-391.
  24. George Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," Economics Working Papers 0054, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  25. Qiang Fu & Qian Jiao & Jingfeng Lu, 2011. "On disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 419-434, September.
  26. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
  27. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(1), pages 233-265.
  28. Christian Schultz, 2005. "Virtual Capacity and Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1487, CESifo Group Munich.
  29. M. Sysi-Aho & J. Saramäki & J. Kertész & K. Kaski, 2005. "Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 44(1), pages 129-135, 03.
  30. Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
  31. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
  32. Zhijian Wang & Yanran Zhou & Jaimie W. Lien & Jie Zheng & Bin Xu, 2016. "Extortion Can Outperform Generosity in the Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001297, UCLA Department of Economics.
  33. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans and debt," Staff Report 125, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  34. Giulio Federico, 2004. "Samaritans, Rotten Kids and Policy Conditionality," Development and Comp Systems 0409004, EconWPA.
  35. Phillip Johnson & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1998. "Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2138, David K. Levine.
  36. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 561-579.
  37. Balanquit, Romeo, 2010. "Tolerance, Cooperation, and Equilibrium Restoration in Repeated Games," MPRA Paper 21877, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  38. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession," Game Theory and Information 0505003, EconWPA.
  39. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2010. "Dismissals and quits in repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 67-80, April.
  40. Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2010.
  41. repec:cla:levarc:786969000000001297 is not listed on IDEAS
  42. Monte, Daniel, 2016. "Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 18-21.
  43. Roger Lagunoff & Matthew Haag, 2002. "One Size and Structure of Group Cooperation," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-05, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
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