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Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents

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  • M. Sysi-Aho

    ()

  • J. Saramäki
  • J. Kertész
  • K. Kaski

Abstract

We have studied a spatially extended snowdrift game, in which the players are located on the sites of two-dimensional square lattices and repeatedly have to choose one of the two strategies, either cooperation (C) or defection (D). A player interacts with its nearest neighbors only, and aims at playing a strategy which maximizes its instant pay-off, assuming that the neighboring agents retain their strategies. If a player is not content with its current strategy, it will change it to the opposite one with probability p next round. Here we show through simulations and analytical approach that these rules result in cooperation levels, which differ to large extent from those obtained using the replicator dynamics. Copyright EDP Sciences/Società Italiana di Fisica/Springer-Verlag 2005

Suggested Citation

  • M. Sysi-Aho & J. Saramäki & J. Kertész & K. Kaski, 2005. "Spatial snowdrift game with myopic agents," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 44(1), pages 129-135, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:44:y:2005:i:1:p:129-135
    DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2005-00108-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & Eric S. Maskin, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 555-573.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1998. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 224, David K. Levine.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:apmaco:v:307:y:2017:i:c:p:31-37 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Su, Qi & Li, Aming & Wang, Long, 2017. "Spatial structure favors cooperative behavior in the snowdrift game with multiple interactive dynamics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 468(C), pages 299-306.
    3. Szabó, György & Hódsági, Kristóf, 2016. "The role of mixed strategies in spatial evolutionary games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 462(C), pages 198-206.
    4. repec:eee:apmaco:v:294:y:2017:i:c:p:310-317 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:eee:apmaco:v:251:y:2015:i:c:p:192-202 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Zhong, Shiquan & Jia, Ning & Ma, Shoufeng, 2014. "Iterated snowdrift game among mobile agents with myopic expected-reward based decision rule: Numerical and analytical research," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 414(C), pages 6-18.

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