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Monetary Policy under Leviathan Currency Competition

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  • Parag Waknis

    (University of Connecticut and University of Massachusetts Dartmouth)

Abstract

In this paper, we use a dual currency Lagos-Wright model to explore the nature of optimal monetary policy under currency competition using different timing protocols. The central banks are utility maximizing players. To characterize equilibrium with reputation, we model the centralized market sub period of the Lagos-Wright economy as an infinitely repeated game between the two Leviathan central banks (long run players) and a continuum of competitive agents (short run players). Concentrating on Markov strategies in such a game shows that the Markov perfect equilibrium features highest inflation tax. However, allowing for reputation concerns improves the inflation outcome. Such a game typically features multiple equilibriums but the competition between the banks allows the use of renegotiation proof-ness as an equilibrium selection mechanism. Accordingly, equilibrium featuring the lowest inflation tax is weakly renegotiation proof, suggesting that better inflation outcome is more likely in the case of Leviathan currency competition than in the single Leviathan bank case.

Suggested Citation

  • Parag Waknis, 2011. "Monetary Policy under Leviathan Currency Competition," Working papers 2011-21, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-21
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fernando Martin, 2009. "A Positive Theory of Government Debt," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(4), pages 608-631, October.
    2. Head, Allen & Shi, Shouyong, 2003. "A fundamental theory of exchange rates and direct currency trades," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1555-1591, October.
    3. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 206-217, February.
    4. Camera, Gabriele & Craig, Ben & Waller, Christopher J., 2004. "Currency competition in a fundamental model of money," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 521-544, December.
    5. Sun, Hongfei, 2007. "Aggregate uncertainty, money and banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 1929-1948, October.
    6. Soller Curtis, Elisabeth & Waller, Christopher J., 2000. "A search-theoretic model of legal and illegal currency," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 155-184, February.
    7. Parag Waknis, 2011. "Endogenous Monetary Policy: A Leviathan Central Bank in a Lagos-Wright Economy," Working papers 2011-20, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    8. Chow, Gregory C., 1997. "Dynamic Economics: Optimization by the Lagrange Method," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195101928.
    9. Lotz, Sebastien, 2004. "Introducing a new currency: Government policy and prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 959-982, October.
    10. George Selgin, 2008. "Milton Friedman and the Case against Currency Monopoly," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 28(2), pages 287-301, Winter.
    11. Craig, Ben & Waller, C.J.Christopher J., 2004. "Dollarization and currency exchange," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 671-689, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy; currency competition; Leviathan; inflation tax; money search;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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