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The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 2009: In Quest of Behavioural Insurance

  • J Fran�ois Outreville

    ()

    (HEC Montr�al, 3000 cote Sainte Catherine, Montreal, Quebec , Canada H3T 2A7.)

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    The purpose of this article is to review and summarize the papers published in The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review in 2009. Asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard are the keywords in several papers in this volume. These papers highlight how applied research in insurance could help understand the behaviour of policy-holders and have important implications for the insurance industry. This is an important issue in insurance and the papers summarized in this article raise some interesting potential empirical research questions and call for a behavioural research approach applied to insurance, a field that could be defined as behavioural insurance.

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    Article provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its journal The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Issues and Practice.

    Volume (Year): 35 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (July)
    Pages: 484-497

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    Handle: RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:35:y:2010:i:3:p:484-497
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    1. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
    2. Hemenway, David, 1990. "Propitious Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1063-69, November.
    3. Tomas Philipson & John Cawley, 1999. "An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 827-846, September.
    4. Kuniyoshi Saito, 2006. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market Under Rate Regulation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 335-356.
    5. Hung-Hsi Huang, 2006. "Optimal insurance contract under a value-at-risk constraint," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 31(2), pages 91-110, December.
    6. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
    7. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84.
    8. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2000. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," NBER Working Papers 8045, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Ritter, Jay R., 2003. "Behavioral finance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 429-437, September.
    10. Michal Krawczyk, 2009. "The Role of Repetition and Observability in Deterring Insurance Fraud," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 34(1), pages 74-87, June.
    11. De Meza, D. & Webb, D.C., 2000. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Market," Discussion Papers 0007, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    12. John Y. Campbell & Luis Viceira, 2005. "The Term Structure of the Risk-Return Tradeoff," NBER Working Papers 11119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    14. Kili C Wang & Rachel J Huang & Larry Y Tzeng, 2009. "Empirical Evidence for Advantageous Selection in the Commercial Fire Insurance Market*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, June.
    15. Spence, Michael & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1971. "Insurance, Information, and Individual Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 380-87, May.
    16. Cardon, James H & Hendel, Igal, 2001. "Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 408-27, Autumn.
    17. John Quiggin & Robert G Chambers, 2009. "Bargaining Power and Efficiency in Insurance Contracts," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 34(1), pages 47-73, June.
    18. Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P. & Gibbens, A., 1993. "An Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Cahiers de recherche 93010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    19. Venezia, Itzhak & Galai, Dan & Shapira, Zur, 1999. "Exclusive vs. independent agents: a separating equilibrium approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 443-456, December.
    20. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug..
    21. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Contracting under Ex Post Moral Hazard and Non-Commitment," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-30, CIRANO.
    22. Campbell, John Y. & Viceira, Luis M., 2002. "Strategic Asset Allocation: Portfolio Choice for Long-Term Investors," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198296942.
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