IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jeczfn/v55y1992i2p169-191.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players

Author

Listed:
  • Per Overgaard

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Per Overgaard, 1992. "Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short-term players," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 169-191, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:55:y:1992:i:2:p:169-191
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01227419
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01227419
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF01227419?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    2. Sorin, Sylvain, 1992. "Repeated games with complete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 71-107, Elsevier.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 12, pages 231-273, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 1, pages 3-20, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & Eric S. Maskin, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(4), pages 555-573.
    7. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    8. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
    9. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "Monopoly And Credibility In Asset Markets: An Example," Working papers 539, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    10. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    11. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "Equilibrium Payoffs Long-Run And Short-Run Players And Imperfect Public Information," Working papers 524, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    12. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ann Horowitz & Ira Horowitz, 1999. "Quality choice: Does it matter which workers own and manage the cooperative firm?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(4), pages 394-409, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Du, Chuang, 2012. "Solving payoff sets of perfect public equilibria: an example," MPRA Paper 38622, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
    4. Wilson, Alistair J. & Wu, Hong, 2017. "At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 487-507.
    5. Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 2000. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 207-236, Summer.
    6. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2009. "Firm reputation and horizontal integration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 340-363, June.
    8. Abreu, Dilip & Milgrom, Paul & Pearce, David, 1991. "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1713-1733, November.
    9. Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2009. "Firm reputation and horizontal integration," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 340-363, June.
    10. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 2004. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 317-349.
    11. Guéron, Yves, 2015. "Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 128-145.
    12. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Shirking Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    13. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, January.
    14. Guillaume Cheikbossian & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2011. "Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 101-102, pages 327-345.
    15. Mouraviev, Igor, 2006. "Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication," Working Paper Series 672, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    16. Alistair Wilson & Hong Wu, 2014. "Dissolution of Partnerships in Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Paper 532, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Aug 2014.
    17. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13104, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Alice Peng-Ju Su, 2019. "Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 687-712, June.
    19. D Vandegrift, 2001. "Quality‐Assuring Price And Breach Of Express Or Implied Warranty," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(2), pages 186-196, April.
    20. Harrison Cheng, 2000. "Folk Theorem with One-sided Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 338-363, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:55:y:1992:i:2:p:169-191. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.