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Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information

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Cited by:

  1. Gilli, Mario, 1999. "On Non-Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 184-203, May.
  2. Azrieli, Yaron & Levin, Dan, 2011. "Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 301-309.
  3. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
  4. Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2007. "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 551-557, July.
  5. Bach, Christian W. & Perea, Andrés, 2020. "Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  6. Shuige Liu, 2018. "Characterizing Permissibility, Proper Rationalizability, and Iterated Admissibility by Incomplete Information," Papers 1811.01933, arXiv.org.
  7. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
  8. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio, 2011. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-40, March.
  9. Müller, Christoph, 2020. "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
  10. Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher, 1994. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 299-311, March.
  11. Takashi Kunimoto & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Working Papers 2020-23, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  12. Pomatto, Luciano, 2022. "Stable matching under forward-induction reasoning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
  13. Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2016. "Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(3), pages 648-667, March.
  14. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Pietro Tebaldi, 2019. "Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 737-763, October.
  15. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
  16. Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2017. "Uncertain information structures and backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 135-151.
  17. Frick, Mira & Romm, Assaf, 2015. "Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 56-71.
  18. Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2019. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2003-2035, November.
  19. Mackenzie, Andrew & Zhou, Yu, 2022. "Menu mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  20. Cappelletti Giuseppe, 2010. "A Note on Rationalizability and Restrictions on Beliefs," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, September.
  21. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
  22. Charness, Gary & Naef, Michael & Sontuoso, Alessandro, 2019. "Opportunistic conformism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 100-134.
  23. Harrington, Joseph E., 2017. "A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 140-158.
  24. Perea Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  25. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2011. "Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 288-300, May.
  26. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Leonetti, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio, 2020. "Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 533-547.
  27. Guarino, Pierfrancesco, 2020. "An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 257-288.
  28. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.
  29. Burkhard C. Schipper & Hang Zhou, 2022. "Level-k Thinking in the Extensive Form," Working Papers 352, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  30. Makoto Shimoji, 2022. "Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 451-481, November.
  31. Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2016. "Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 179-208.
  32. Shuige Liu, 2018. "Characterizing Assumption of Rationality by Incomplete Information," Papers 1801.04714, arXiv.org.
  33. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2017. "Redefinition of Belief Distorted Nash Equilibria for the Environment of Dynamic Games with Probabilistic Beliefs," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 984-1007, March.
  34. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  35. Shimoji, Makoto & Schweinzer, Paul, 2015. "Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 258-267.
  36. Liu, Qingmin, 2015. "Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 49-75.
  37. Kets, Willemien & Kager, Wouter & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2022. "The value of a coordination game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
  38. Mounir, Angie & Perea, Andrés & Tsakas, Elias, 2018. "Common belief in approximate rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 6-16.
  39. Catonini, Emiliano, 2020. "On non-monotonic strategic reasoning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 209-224.
  40. José Penalva & Michael D. Ryall, 2001. "Causal assessment in finite extensive-form games," Economics Working Papers 483, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 2003.
  41. Jose Penalva-Zuasti & Michael D. Ryall, 2003. "Causal Assessment in Finite-length Extensive-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000074, David K. Levine.
  42. Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Manili, J., 2023. "Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 527-551.
  43. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2003. "Proper rationalizability and belief revision in dynamic games," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  44. Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Informational robustness of common belief in rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 592-597.
  45. Shuige Liu, 2021. "Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 119-148, March.
  46. Penta, Antonio, 2015. "Robust dynamic implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 280-316.
  47. Paul Schweinzer & Makoto Shimoji, "undated". "Captain MacWhirr's Problem Revisited," Discussion Papers 11/12, Department of Economics, University of York.
  48. Catonini, Emiliano, 2019. "Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 101-117.
  49. Ahn, David S., 2007. "Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 286-301, September.
  50. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
  51. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2020. "Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 62-73.
  52. Yamashita, Takuro, 2015. "Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 267-279.
  53. Oury, Marion, 2015. "Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 656-677.
  54. Amanda Friedenberg & Martin Meier, 2017. "The context of the game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(2), pages 347-386, February.
  55. Pierpaolo Angelini & Fabrizio Maturo, 2022. "The consumer’s demand functions defined to study contingent consumption plans," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 1159-1175, June.
  56. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.
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