More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria
This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class is that of two-player nice games, i.e., games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces and continuous and strictly quasi-concave payoff functions, assumptions met by many economic models. We then show that the sufficient conditions for Theorem to hold are tight.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2005|
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