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On the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game

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Abstract

We show that if y is an odd integer between 1 and 2^{n} - 1, there is an n x n bimatrix game with exactly y Nash equilibria (NE). We conjecture that this 2^{n} - 1 is a tight upper for n

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  • Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik, 1994. "On the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1089, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1089
    Note: CFP 958.
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d10/d1089.pdf
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    1. Quint, Thomas & Shubik, Martin, 2002. "A bound on the number of Nash equilibria in a coordination game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 323-327, November.
    2. Barany, I & Lee, J & Shubik, M, 1992. "Classification of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(3), pages 267-290.
    3. B. Curtis Eaves, 1971. "The Linear Complementarity Problem," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(9), pages 612-634, May.
    4. Powers, Imelda Yeung, 1990. "Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in N-Person Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(3), pages 277-286.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2007. "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 551-557, July.
    2. Quint, Thomas & Shubik, Martin, 2002. "A bound on the number of Nash equilibria in a coordination game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 323-327, November.
    3. McLennan, Andrew, 1997. "The Maximal Generic Number of Pure Nash Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 408-410, February.
    4. Keiding, Hans, 1997. "On the Maximal Number of Nash Equilibria in ann x nBimatrix Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 148-160, October.
    5. Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik & Dickey Yan, 1995. "Dumb Bugs and Bright Noncooperative Players: Games, Context and Behavior," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1094, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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