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Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory

  • P. Herings

    ()

  • Ronald Peeters

This paper presents a complete survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory.Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by variousselection theories. We present all relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms.We give detailed expositions of the Lemke-Howson algorithm and the Van den Elzen-Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and the Herings-Vanden Elzen, Herings-Peeters, and McKelvey-Palfrey algorithms to compute Nash equilibriain general n-person games.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-009-0441-5
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 42 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 119-156

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:1:p:119-156
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