IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v21y2003i2p585-603.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer

Author

Listed:
  • John Geanakoplos

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • John Geanakoplos, 2003. "Nash and Walras equilibrium via Brouwer," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 585-603, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:585-603 DOI: 10.1007/s001990000076
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001990000076
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1998. "Complementarity in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 667-684, November.
    2. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 201-204.
    3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1991. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 130-134.
    4. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. "Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-430, March.
    5. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 291-305.
    6. Tollison, Robert D, 1982. "Rent Seeking: A Survey," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 575-602.
    7. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 643-651.
    8. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 283-290.
    9. Wolfgang Maennig, 2002. "On the Economics of Doping and Corruption in International Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(1), pages 61-89, February.
    10. Kyung Hwan Baik, 2004. "Two-Player Asymmetric Contests with Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(4), pages 679-689, October.
    11. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 1997. "The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-045/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    12. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005. "Asymmetric contests with general technologies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
    13. Montgomery, James D, 1991. "Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1407-1418.
    14. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1999. "The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(3-4), pages 439-454, June.
    15. Gil S. Epstein & Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Lobbying contests with alternative instruments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 81-89, April.
    16. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
    17. Jack Hirshleifer, 1990. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," UCLA Economics Working Papers 597, UCLA Department of Economics.
    18. J. Amegashie & Marco Runkel, 2007. "Sabotaging Potential Rivals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 143-162, January.
    19. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers 9368, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    20. Stein, William E, 2002. "Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 325-336, December.
    21. Kong-Pin Chen, 2003. "Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 119-140, April.
    22. Berentsen, Aleksander, 2002. "The economics of doping," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 109-127, March.
    23. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers 10-93-9, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    24. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1997. "The Distribution of Income in the Presence of Appropriative Activities," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(253), pages 101-117, February.
    25. Eguchi, Kyota, 2005. "Job transfer and influence activities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 187-197, February.
    26. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
    27. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 283-290.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tim Roughgarden, 2018. "Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," Papers 1801.00734, arXiv.org.
    2. Ruscitti, Francesco, 2012. "On the boundary behavior of the excess demand function," Research in Economics, Elsevier, pages 371-374.
    3. Papadimitriou, Christos, 2015. "The Complexity of Computing Equilibria," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    4. P. Herings & Ronald Peeters, 2010. "Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 119-156.
    5. Stauber, Ronald, 2011. "Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 248-274, January.
    6. Galeazzo Impicciatore & Luca Panaccione & Francesco Ruscitti, 2012. "Walras’ theory of capital formation: an intertemporal equilibrium reformulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(2), pages 99-118, June.
    7. Luc Lauwers, 2009. "The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 449-476, September.
    8. Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2004. "Equilibria in sequential bargaining games as solutions to systems of equations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 407-411, September.
    9. Haake, Claus-Jochen & Su, Francis Edward, 2011. "A simplicial algorithm approach to Nash equilibria in concave games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 382, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    10. P. Herings & Ronald Peeters, 2010. "Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 119-156.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Keywords and Phrases: Equilibrium; Nash; Walras; Brouwer; Kakutani.; JEL Classification Numbers: C6; C62.;

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:21:y:2003:i:2:p:585-603. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.