Probabilistic Choice in Games: Properties of Rosenthal’s t-Solutions
In t-solutions, quantal response equilibria based on the linear probability model as introduced in R.W. Rosenthal (1989, Int. J. Game Theory 18, 273-292), choice probabilities are related to the determination of leveling taxes. The set of t-solutions coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of a game with quadratic control costs. Increasing the rationality of the players allows them to successively eliminate higher levels of strictly dominated actions. Moreover, there exists a path of t-solutions linking uniform randomization to Nash equilibrium.
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Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 105-121
| Handle: | RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:105-121 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00182-005-0003-4 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://www.springer.com Web page: http://www.gametheorysociety.org/about.html
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| Order Information: | Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/182/PS2 |
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