Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games
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- Von Stengel, Bernhard, 2002. "Computing equilibria for two-person games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 45, pages 1723-1759 Elsevier.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Eitan Zemel, 1988.
"Nash and Correlated Equilibria: Some Complexity Considerations,"
777, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Zemel, Eitan, 1989. "Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 80-93, March.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Eitan Zemel, 1989. "Nash and Correlated Equilibria: Some Complexity Considerations," Post-Print hal-00753241, HAL.
- McLennan, A., 1999.
"The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game,"
306, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
- Andrew McLennan, 2005. "The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 141-174, 01.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & McLennan, Andrew, 1994.
"The Maximal Number of Regular Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria,"
865, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- McKelvey, Richard D. & McLennan, Andrew, 1997. "The Maximal Number of Regular Totally Mixed Nash Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 411-425, February.
- McKelvey, R.D. & McLennan, A., 1994. "The Maximal Number of Regular Totaly Mixed Nash Equilibria," Papers 272, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
- McLennan, Andrew & Park, In-Uck, 1999.
"Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 111-130, January.
- McLennan, A & Park, I-U, 1997. "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Papers 300, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
- Powers, Imelda Yeung, 1990. "Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in N-Person Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(3), pages 277-286.
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