The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Laurent Mathevet, 2010.
"A contraction principle for finite global games,"
Economic Theory,
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(3), pages 539-563, March.
- Mathevet, Laurent, "undated". "A contraction principle for finite global games," Working Papers 1243, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2016. "Random extensive form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 517-535.
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