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The number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random multi-team games

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  • Stanford, William

Abstract

We show that in random multi-team games, large numbers of pure strategy Nash equilibria are highly probable when the number of teams, the size of teams, or pure strategy set cardinalities are large.

Suggested Citation

  • Stanford, William, 2010. "The number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random multi-team games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 352-354, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:3:p:352-354
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rinott, Yosef & Scarsini, Marco, 2000. "On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 274-293, November.
    2. Stanford, William, 1999. "On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 29-34, January.
    3. Powers, Imelda Yeung, 1990. "Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in N-Person Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(3), pages 277-286.
    4. Roberts, David P., 2005. "Pure Nash equilibria of coordination matrix games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 7-11, October.
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