The number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in random multi-team games
We show that in random multi-team games, large numbers of pure strategy Nash equilibria are highly probable when the number of teams, the size of teams, or pure strategy set cardinalities are large.
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- Roberts, David P., 2005. "Pure Nash equilibria of coordination matrix games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 7-11, October.
- Stanford, William, 1999. "On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 29-34, January.
- Rinott, Yosef & Scarsini, Marco, 2000. "On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 274-293, November.
- Powers, Imelda Yeung, 1990. "Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in N-Person Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 277-86.
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