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Citations for "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise"

by Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David

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  1. Inderst, Roman & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2010. "Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 8089, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Gerardi, Dino & Maestri, Lucas, 2012. "A principal-agent model of sequential testing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  3. Michael Hilmer, 2014. "Too Many to Fail - How Bonus Taxation Prevents Gambling for Bailouts," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-18, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  4. Feess, Eberhard & Walzl, Markus, 2006. "Why it Pays to Conceal - On the Optimal Timing of Acquiring Verifiable Information," Research Memorandum 020, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2008. "Biased Motivation of Experts: Should They be Aggressive or Conservative?," CARF F-Series CARF-F-133, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  6. Verge, Thibaud & Malavolti-Grimal, Estelle & Loss, Frédéric, 2013. "Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate?," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/12189, Paris Dauphine University.
  7. Engert, Andreas & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2013. "Why agents need discretion: The business judgment rule as optimal standard of care," Working Papers 13-04, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  8. Antoinette Baujard, 2013. "Value judgments and economics expertise," Working Papers 1314, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  9. Yoon, Young-Ro, 2009. "Endogenous timing of actions under conflict between two types of second mover advantage," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 728-738, November.
  10. Hilmer, Michael, 2014. "Too many to fail - How bonus taxation prevents gambling for bailouts," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100552, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  11. Francis de Véricourt & Denis Gromb, 2014. "Financing capacity investment under demand uncertainty," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-14-03, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
  12. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2013. "Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9552, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Heider, Florian & Inderst, Roman, 2012. "Loan prospecting," Working Paper Series 1439, European Central Bank.
  14. Flavia Roldán, 2013. "The organization of expertise in the presence of communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 63-81, March.
  15. Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2012. "Information Sharing between Vertical Hierarchies," CSEF Working Papers 322, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  16. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2014. "Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 9877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2008. "Biased Motivation of Experts: Should They be Aggressive or Conservative?," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-585, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  18. Dilek Bülbül & Felix Noth & Marcel Tyrell, 2014. "Why Do Banks Provide Leasing?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 137-175, October.
  19. Sylvain Bourjade & Bruno Jullien, 2011. "The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 575-594, 09.
  20. Groll, Thomas & Ellis, Christopher J., 2012. "A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry," MPRA Paper 36168, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2012. "Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 442-474, 09.
  22. James Malcomson, 2009. "Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model," Economics Series Working Papers 453, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  23. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2015. "Regulating deferred incentive pay," IMFS Working Paper Series 91, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS), Goethe University Frankfurt.
  24. Junichiro Ishida, 2014. "Hierarchies Versus Committees: Communication and Information Acquisition in Organizations," ISER Discussion Paper 0914, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  25. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
  26. Jean-Etienne de Bettignies & Jan Zabojnik, 2013. "Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations," Working Papers 1321, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  27. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2012. "Correlation and relative performance evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 93-117.
  28. Ulf Axelson & Philip Bond, 2015. "Wall Street occupations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37448, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  29. Shirley J. , HO, 2007. "R&D Outsourcing Contract with Information Leakage," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007026, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  30. Joyee Deb & Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee, 2015. "Relational Contracts with Subjective Peer Evaluations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1995, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.