Communication and Binary Decision : Is it Better to Communicate ?
We study information transmission between an informed expert and an uninformed decision-maker when the decision is binary and the expert does not have a systematic bias. Whenever, an equilibrium exists where the decision is delegated to the expert, it is ex-ante Pareto-dominant. Adding a round of multilateral communication does not improve information transmission. The decision-maker can however improve information transmission by communicating sequentially with two experts. However, introduce multiple rounds of communication (i.e., allowing for rebuttal) does not help
|Date of creation:||Sep 2013|
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