Communication and Binary Decisions: Is it Better to Communicate?
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- Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti & Thibaud Vergé, 2013. "Communication and Binary Decision : Is it Better to Communicate ?," Working Papers 2013-50, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti & Thibaud Vergé, 2013. "Communication and binary decisions : is it better to communicate ?," Post-Print hal-00874852, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Marco Battaglini, 2002.
"Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
- Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Marco Battaglini, 2000. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1557, Econometric Society.
- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, March.
- Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.
- Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
- Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
- Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2009.
"Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game,"
05-08r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2012. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08rrr, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2011. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08rr, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/1121 is not listed on IDEAS
- Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2006. "A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 395-410, December.
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More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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