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Communication and binary decisions : is it better to communicate ?


  • Frédéric Loss

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNAM Paris - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers - Paris - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM])

  • Estelle Malavolti

    () (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics, LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)

  • Thibaud Vergé

    (Competition Authority - Competition Authority)


We study information transmission between an informed expert and an uninformed decision-maker when the decision is binary and the expert does not have a systematic bias. Whenever an equilibrium exists where the decision is delegated to the expert, it is ex ante Pareto-dominant. Adding a round of multilateral communication does not improve information transmission. The decision-maker can, however, improve information transmission by communicating sequentially with two experts. However, introducing multiple rounds of communication (i.e., allowing for rebuttal) does not help.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Loss & Estelle Malavolti & Thibaud Vergé, 2013. "Communication and binary decisions : is it better to communicate ?," Post-Print hal-00874852, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00874852
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13621221166330
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
    2. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, January.
    3. Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/1121 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Rubinstein, Ariel & Glazer, Jacob, 2006. "A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 395-410, December.
    6. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
      • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
    7. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
    8. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
    9. Chirantan Ganguly & Indrajit Ray, 2009. "Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game," Discussion Papers 05-08r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    10. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.

    More about this item


    communication; delegation; experts; information transmission; cheap-talk;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness


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