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Citations for "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model"

by Kim, Son Ku

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  1. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2006. "Moral Hazard and Persistence," 2006 Meeting Papers 670, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Unobservable Persistent Productivity and Long Term Contracts," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 333-349, April.
  3. Corgnet, Brice & Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael, 2013. "Are you a good employee or simply a good guy? Influence costs and contract design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 259-272.
  4. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 359-378.
  5. Newman, Andrew F., 2007. "Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 11-26, November.
  6. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Liability insurance under the negligence rule," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 486-508.
  7. Joachim Gassen, 2008. "Are stewardship and valuation usefulness compatible or alternative objectives of financial accounting?," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-028, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  8. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 460-470, August.
  9. Jörg Budde, 2005. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  10. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2007. "The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 287-307, August.
  11. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard, 2009. "Modelling information and hedging: the exporting firm," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 02/09, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  12. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2004. "Auditing policies and information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 86, Econometric Society.
  13. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-agent Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 02-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  14. Larmande, Francois, 2013. "Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 314-317.
  15. Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 1994. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Economics Working Papers 94-227, University of California at Berkeley.
  16. Jörg Budde & Matthias Kräkel, 2011. "Limited liability and the risk–incentive relationship," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(2), pages 97-110, March.
  17. Budde, Jörg, 2009. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 59-72, January.
  18. Chade, Hector & Silvers, Randy, 2002. "Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 291-300, February.
  19. Nafziger, Julia, 2009. "Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(11), pages 751-766, December.
  20. Fluet, Claude, 2010. "Liability rules under evidentiary uncertainty," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-9, March.
  21. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard, 2009. "Modelling information and hedging: The exporting firm," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 974-977, September.
  22. Florian Englmaier & Stephen Leider, 2012. "Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 146-183, May.
  23. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2001. "Monitoring versus incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1741-1764, October.
  24. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan, 2001. "Estimation Of An Optimal Tomato Contract," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20560, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  25. Silvers, Randy, 2012. "The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 352-365.
  26. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
  27. Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series 293, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  28. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1995. "Imperfect state verification and financial contracting," Working Paper 9506, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  29. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
  30. Li, Fei & Ueda, Masako, 2009. "Why do reputable agents work for safer firms?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 2-12, March.
  31. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2008. "The Optimality of Simple Contracts: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse17_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  32. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1997. "Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 47, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  33. Hooper, Louise, 2008. "Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the payment model," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 157-163, January.
  34. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1029-1059, December.
  35. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard & Wong, Kit Pong, 2010. "International trade and the role of market transparency," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 08/10, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  36. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2005. "A contracting perspective on earnings quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 265-294, June.
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