IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model"

by Kim, Son Ku

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Claude Fluet, 2006. "Liability Rules under Evidentiary Uncertainty," Cahiers de recherche 0606, CIRPEE.
  2. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-agent Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 02-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  3. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2008. "The Optimality of Simple Contracts: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse17_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Florian Englmaier & Stephen Leider, 2012. "Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 146-83, May.
  5. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 460-470, August.
  6. Jörg Budde & Matthias Kräkel, 2008. "Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse6_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  7. Li, Fei & Ueda, Masako, 2009. "Why do reputable agents work for safer firms?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 2-12, March.
  8. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2006. "Moral Hazard and Persistence," 2006 Meeting Papers 670, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series 293, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  10. Andrew F. Newman, 2007. "Risk-Bearing and Entrepreneurship," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-162, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  11. Chade, Hector & Silvers, Randy, 2002. "Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 291-300, February.
  12. Joachim Gassen, 2008. "Are stewardship and valuation usefulness compatible or alternative objectives of financial accounting?," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-028, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  13. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2004. "Auditing policies and information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 86, Econometric Society.
  14. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Liability Insurance under the Negligence Rule," Cahiers de recherche 0730, CIRPEE.
  15. Brice Corgnet & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, 2012. "Are you a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy? Infl?uence Costs and Contract Design," Working Papers 12-02, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  16. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2003. "The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality," CESifo Working Paper Series 969, CESifo Group Munich.
  17. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard, 2009. "Modelling information and hedging: the exporting firm," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 02/09, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  18. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
  19. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2000. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Finance 9912001, EconWPA.
  20. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan, 2001. "Estimation Of An Optimal Tomato Contract," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20560, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  21. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1997. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 97034, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  22. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2001. "Monitoring versus incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1741-1764, October.
  23. Hooper, Louise, 2008. "Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the payment model," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 157-163, January.
  24. Randy Silvers, 2006. "The Value of Information in an Agency Model with Moral Hazard," Economics Series 2006_22, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  25. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1995. "Imperfect state verification and financial contracting," Working Paper 9506, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  26. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1997. "Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 47, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  27. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2010. "Unobservable Persistent Productivity and Long Term Contracts," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 333-349, April.
  28. Koch, Alexander K. & Nafziger, Julia, 2007. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 2973, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  29. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
  30. Silvers, Randy, 2012. "The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 352-365.
  31. Budde, Jörg, 2009. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 59-72, January.
  32. Randy Silvers, 2006. "The Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard: The Ex Ante Contracting Case," Economics Series 2006_23, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  33. Larmande, Francois, 2013. "Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 314-317.
  34. Jörg Budde, 2005. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  35. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard & Wong, Kit Pong, 2010. "International trade and the role of market transparency," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 08/10, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  36. Nafziger, Julia, 2009. "Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(11), pages 751-766, December.
  37. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2005. "A contracting perspective on earnings quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 265-294, June.
  38. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard, 2009. "Modelling information and hedging: The exporting firm," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 974-977, September.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.