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Citations for "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model"

by Kim, Son Ku

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  1. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet, 2009. "Liability insurance under the negligence rule," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 486-508.
  2. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
  3. Hugo Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2007. "Moral hazard and persistence," Working Paper 07-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  4. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller & Philipp Weinschenk, 2008. "The Optimality of Simple Contracts: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse17_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.
  5. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1997. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Working Papers 97034, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  6. Kim, Son Ku & Wang, Susheng, 1998. "Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 342-378, October.
  7. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 1994. "Corporate Diversification and Agency," Industrial Organization 9402001, EconWPA, revised 15 Nov 1996.
  8. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Marie-Cécile Fagart, 2004. "Auditing policies and information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 86, Econometric Society.
  9. Strausz, Roland, 2004. "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 27, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  10. Chade, Hector & Silvers, Randy, 2002. "Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 291-300, February.
  11. Randy Silvers, 2006. "The Value of Information in an Agency Model with Moral Hazard," Economics Series 2006_22, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  12. Li, Fei & Ueda, Masako, 2009. "Why do reputable agents work for safer firms?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 2-12, March.
  13. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard, 2009. "Modelling information and hedging: the exporting firm," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 02/09, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  14. Newman, Andrew F., 2007. "Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 11-26, November.
  15. Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2003. "The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality," CESifo Working Paper Series 969, CESifo Group Munich.
  16. Koch, Alexander K. & Nafziger, Julia, 2007. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 2973, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  17. Silvers, Randy, 2012. "The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 352-365.
  18. Brice Corgnet & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, 2012. "Are you a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy? Infl?uence Costs and Contract Design," Working Papers 12-02, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  19. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard & Wong, Kit Pong, 2010. "International trade and the role of market transparency," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 08/10, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  20. Jörg Budde, 2005. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  21. Florian Englmaier & Stephen G. Leider, 2008. "Contractual and Organizational Structurewith Reciprocal Agents," CESifo Working Paper Series 2415, CESifo Group Munich.
  22. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-agent Analysis," Cahiers de recherche 02-02, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  23. Randy Silvers, 2006. "The Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard: The Ex Ante Contracting Case," Economics Series 2006_23, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  24. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2001. "Monitoring versus incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1741-1764, October.
  25. Larmande, Francois, 2013. "Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 314-317.
  26. Hugo H. Hopenhayn & Arantxa Jarque, 2009. "Unobservable Persistant Productivity and Long Term Contracts," Economics Working Papers we092717, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  27. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1997. "Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 47, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  28. Claude Fluet, 2006. "Liability Rules under Evidentiary Uncertainty," Cahiers de recherche 0606, CIRPEE.
  29. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan, 2001. "Estimation Of An Optimal Tomato Contract," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20560, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  30. Budde, Jörg, 2009. "Information in tournaments under limited liability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 59-72, January.
  31. Hooper, Louise, 2008. "Paying for performance: Uncertainty, asymmetric information and the payment model," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 157-163, January.
  32. Joachim Gassen, 2008. "Are stewardship and valuation usefulness compatible or alternative objectives of financial accounting?," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-028, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  33. Nafziger, Julia, 2009. "Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(11), pages 751-766, December.
  34. Lilia Filipova, 2007. "Monitoring and Privacy in Automobile Insurance Markets with Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper Series 293, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  35. Jörg Budde & Matthias Kräkel, 2011. "Limited liability and the risk–incentive relationship," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(2), pages 97-110, March.
  36. Christensen, Peter O. & Feltham, Gerald A. & Sabac, Florin, 2005. "A contracting perspective on earnings quality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 265-294, June.
  37. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard, 2009. "Modelling information and hedging: The exporting firm," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 974-977, September.
  38. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1995. "Imperfect state verification and financial contracting," Working Paper 9506, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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